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II.

Introduction
It has been said of the United Kingdom Bills of Exchange Act,
'The following paper by Professor Geva and the accompanying two commentaries by
Messrs. Scott and Sedgwick were presented at the Eleventh Annual Workshop on
Commercial and Consumer Law held at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto on
October 23-24, 1981.
t Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. Copyright ©
1981, by Benjamin Geva. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Ann Wilson,
consulting assistant editor of the Journal, in the revision of this paper.
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18821 that it is "the best drafted Act of Parliament ever passed". 2
The Act has been adopted in many countries of the
Commonwealth, 3 including Canada, 4 and has contributed to
certainty and uniformity in an important branch of commercial
law.
The approaching centennial anniversary of the statute provides
an excellent occasion for re-evaluation and re-examination. Only
a year after the passage of the statute, its drafter confessed that5
he "could do it better and should profit by past experience".
While it is overwhelmingly accepted that the Act succeeded in
codifying the rules applicable to bills and notes 6 as well as in
providing for a statutory machinery which has so far been viable,
there are some areas which require improvement. Reflections on
such areas are the subject-matter of this paper.
The paper discusses three areas in which the interaction
between the provisions of the Act and case law has failed to
provide satisfactory results. Part I deals with holder in due course
issues: conditions for holding in due course, results of holding in
due course, and the payee as a holder in due course. Part II deals
with the drawee bank's right to recover on cheques paid by
mistake of fact. Part III deals with the responsiveness to policy
considerations of the scheme allocating forgery losses. I chose not
to deal in this paper with questions of strict statutory interpretation not involving an issue with a substantial doctrinal or policy
flavour, as for example, liability on an instrument signed in a
representative capacity. 7 Likewise, I excluded from the paper
1 45-46 Vict., c. 61 as amended.
2 Bank Polski v. K.J. Mulder and Co., [1942] 1 K.B. 497 (C.A.), at p. 500, per MacKinnon
L.J.
3 For a complete list of jurisdictions, see Falconbridgeon Banking and Bills of Exchange,
7th ed., A. W. Rogers ed. (Toronto, Canada Law Book Ltd., 1969), pp. 431-2.
4
The Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5 as amended (hereafter "BEA", "the
Act" or "the Canadian Act"). For a short account of the history of the Act in the United
Kingdom and Canada see Falconbridge, The Law of Negotiable Instruments in Canada
(1967), p. 2. For the special features of the Canadian statute see Falconbridge, supra,
footnote 3 at p. 427. Unless otherwise indicated, references to sections in this paper are
to the sections of the Canadian Act.
5 Introduction to the 3rd ed. (1883), reproduced in Chalmers' Digest of the Law of Bills of
Exchange, 11th ed., F. R. Batt ed. (1947), pp. xxxiv, xxxvii.
6 The codifying nature of the BEA is highlighted in Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros.,
[1891] A.C. 107 (H.L.), at pp. 144-5. Undoubtedly, the limits on the applicability of preAct common law rules contributed much to uniformity among BEA jurisdictions.
7 On this question (relating to s. 52), see Glatt v. Rit, [19731 2 0.R. 447 at pp. 454-5, 34
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issues discussed by me at length elsewhere, such as the rights of
one not holder in due course, or more particularly, his position8
regarding the defences of failure and absence of consideration.
Another subject falling within this excluded category is that of
consumer bills and notes covered by Part V of the Act 9 which I
have dealt with only briefly in this paper. Other areas were
excluded due to space limitations. Thus, I did not deal with the
issues of the scope of the Act, namely the definition of the various
negotiable instruments covered by it, the applicability of the Act
to negotiable instruments issued or drawn by banks, and the
principles governing the interaction between the provisions of the
Act and general principles of law.' 0 I also did not deal with issues
relating to the transfer and negotiation of a bill or note, material
alteration, and the effect of payment by bill or note on the
obligation for which it is given. Questions relating to collection of
cheques are omitted as well, as they would better be dealt with
as part of a comprehensive discussion on the Canadian payment

system. 12
I.

Holder in Due Course Issues

One who holds an instrument "free from any defect of title of
prior parties, as well as from mere personal defences available to
prior parties among themselves" and who "may enforce payment
against all parties liable on the [instrument]" (s. 74(b)) is called a
"holder in due course". His position constitutes an important
exception to the nemo dat quod non habet rule. It is explained by
the currency of negotiable instruments 3 and is central to the law
D.L.R. (3d) 295 at pp. 302-3 (H.C.J.), summary of Wright J.; a critical comment by
Marvin G. Baer, 51 Can. Bar Rev. 666 (1973); and Holtz v. G & G Parkdale Refrigeration Ltd. (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 185, 12 B.L.R. 300 (Ont. H.C.J.).
8 Failure of consideration is discussed in Geva, "Equities as to Liability on Bills and
Notes: Rights of a Holder Not in Due Course", 5 C.B.L.J. 53 (1980-81). For absence of
consideration, see Geva, "Absence of Consideration in the Law of Bills and Notes",
[1980] Camb. L.J. 360.
9 Discussed in Geva, "Preservation of Consumer Defences: Statutes and Jurisdiction", 32
U. Tor. L.J. 176 (1982).
t0 For an analysis of the last question see my article cited in footnote 9, supra.
1t For a discussion of this subject see Thomas and Orchard, "The Presentment and
Collection of Cheques in Canada", 22 McGill L.J. 203 (1976).
12See, e.g., Stanley Goldstein's study for the federal government on Changing Times:
Banking in the Electronic Age (Ottawa, 1979).
13See, e.g.: Rosenthal, "Negotiability - Who Needs It?", 71 Col. L. Rev. 375 (1971), at
p. 379; Miller v. Race (1758), 1 Burr. 452, 97 E.R. 398.
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governing them. Current issues with respect to his position are:
(i) the conditions for holding in due course; (ii) the results of
holding in due course; and (iii) whether a payee may be a holder
in due course. The last issue is in fact one aspect of the first, but
due to the length of the pertinent discussion, I have chosen to
deal with it separately.
(i) Conditions for holding in due course
At common law, in order to acquire a holder in due course
status, it was sufficient to purchase an instrument bona fide and
for value. 14 Under the Act a person must comply with eight
separate and independent conditions specified in s. 56(1):
(1) he must be a "holder" (defined in s. 2) of an instrument;
(2) the instrument must be complete and regular on the face
of it;
(3) he must have become the holder before the instrument
was overdue;
(4) he must have taken the instrument without notice that it
had been previously dishonoured; and
(5) he must have taken the instrument in good faith,
(6) for value,
(7) by negotiation, and
(8) without notice of any defect in the title of the person who
negotiated it.
"Holder" is defined in s. 2 as "the payee or endorsee of a bill or
note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." According
to Chalmers, the term "signifies the mercantile owner of the
instrument". 15 Since a holder in due course must be a "holder", a
transferee of an unendorsed instrument payable to order does not
acquire a holder in due course status. Such a transferee for value
acquires the transferor's rights as well as "the right to have the
endorsement of the transferor" (s. 61(1)); but to become a holder
in due course, such a transferee must obtain his transferor's
endorsement while still complying with the other elements of s.
56(1). Thus, notice of a defect in his transferor's title, acquired
after the good faith purchase of the instrument but prior to
14
15

Miller v. Race, supra.
Chalmerson Bills of Exchange, 13th ed., D. A. L. Smout ed. (London, Stevens & Sons,
1964), p. 8.
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obtaining endorsement, will prevent
the transferee from
16
becoming a holder in due course.
The requirement that a holder in due course must acquire the
instrument "by negotiation" will be discussed below (section iii)
in connection with the issue of the payee as a holder in due
course.
Besides the "holder" and "by negotiation" elements, all of the
holding in due course requirements are concerned with the good
faith ^purchase for valuable of the instrument.
"Value" under s. 2 is "value consideration". Under s. 53(1):
(1) Valuable consideration ...may be constituted by
(a) any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract;
(b) an antecedent debt or liability.

Subsection (1)(a) has been construed as referring to the general
law of the province, and not necessarily to the common law of
England. 17 This construction which has particular significance for
Quebec undermines uniformity. 18 Yet local variations in matters
not relating to "the law of bills and notes in the strict sense"' 9 are
tolerated by the Act. 20 Furthermore, in commercial transactions
the consideration requirement creates very little (or almost no)
difficulty. As a result I do not think that the statute should be
amended to refer particularly to common law consideration.
"An antecedent debt or liability" under s. 53(1)(b) means that
the promissor's own pre-existing debt is a valid consideration for
a negotiable instrument. This departure from the common law
rule, under which past consideration is no consideration, is not
limited to the law of bills and notes. Rather it is consistent with
the general exception under which a promise
to pay the promis21
sor's own debt requires no consideration.
Does "executory consideration" (e.g., a promise to pay at a
16

See, e.g., Whistler v. Forster(1863), 14 C.B. (N.S.) 248,143 E.R. 441.
17 The leading case is Stephen v. Perrault (1918), 56 Que. S.C. 54. See also Rouleau v.

Poulin, [19651 Que. O.B. 292.
18 Cf. Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at pp. 606-7.

19For this concept see Falconbridge, ibid., at p. 456, and in more detail, Barak, "The
Requirement of Consideration for Bills and Notes in Israel", 2 Israel L. Rev. 499
(1967), at p. 500.
20 See, e.g., s. 47(1):
(1) Capacity to incur liability as a party to a bill is coextensive with capacity to
contract.

This is a direct reference to the various provincial laws governing capacity.
21Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at pp. 610-11.

10-6 C.B.L.J.
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future date) constitute value for holding in due course purposes?
The drafters of the American Uniform Commercial Code
adopted a negative answer in UCC 3-303(a). In the Comment
they gave the following "reason of policy":
... when the purchaser learns of a defense against the instrument or of a
defect in the title he is not required to enforce the instrument, but is free to
rescind the transaction ... There is thus not the same necessity for giving
him the status of a holder in due course, cutting off claims and defenses, as
where he has actually paid value.

At the same time, executory consideration seems to fall within
the ambit of "any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract" within the meaning of s. 53(1)(a). Moreover, under s.
165(3), merely crediting a customer's account with the amount of
a deposited cheque constitutes sufficient "value" for holding in
due course purposes. 22 Such credit is undoubtedly "executory
consideration";23 in fact the opinion of the drafters of the Code is
that bank credit not drawn upon, which can be and is revoked
when a claim or defence appears, is the example par excellence of
an executory consideration which therefore, under the UCC,
24
does not constitute value for holding in due course purposes.
This suggests that the Act rejects the policy adopted by the
drafters of the Code. The rule in the Act is that giving an
executory consideration constitutes taking for value for the
purpose of s. 56(1)(b). Provided he meets the other conditions in
s. 56(1), a holder who acquires an instrument, undertaking to pay
for it at a future time, is a holder in due course. His status is not
defeated by knowledge of a defect of title acquired after his
purchase and undertaking to pay but prior to his payment. It is
submitted that the reversal of this result can effectively be
brought about only by legislative action.
The treatment in the Act of the question of the "good faith
purchase" appears to be somewhat flawed:
(a) While the Act refers in s. 56(1) to "without notice"
separately from "good faith", the former is actually one
element of the latter; and
(b) The requirements that the instrument must be "complete
and regular on the face of it" and that it must not be
22 The provision is cited in full in the text between footnotes 40-1, infra.
23 It could constitute "value" also under the law preceding the enactment of s. 165(3):
Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 615.
24 Official Comment 3 to UCC 3-303. See also UCC 4-208 and 4-209.
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overdue, both have to do with the holder's good faith. At
the same time, the effect of their being listed as separate
and independent requirements is to create an irrebuttable
presumption as to the holder's lack of good faith once
either of them is not fulfilled. The advantage of such
treatment is certainty. 25 The shortcoming is obvious: a
bona fide holder who, for whatever reason, failed to
notice that he acquired an overdue instrument, may not
be a holder in due course.
At common law the standard of good faith for holding in due
course purposes has been transformed from an objective to a
subjective one.2 6 The latter was adopted by the Act. "Good
faith" in other words, requires honesty alone; one could act negligently and still be acting in good faith (s. 3). Likewise, "notice" is
actual notice. Good faith is, none the less, defeated by one's
suspicion combined with a wilful disregard of the means of knowledge, as when the circumstances invite inquiry. 27 In relation to
defences arising from a contract under which a negotiable
instrument has been given, neither mere suspicion of the
existence of defences, nor mere knowledge of the terms of the
contract which are capable of giving rise to defences defeats the
holder's good faith.
The effect of this subjective standard is to withdraw the onus of
inquiry from the taker of a negotiable instrument. This is
consistent with the function of the holder in due course doctrine
which is to facilitate the currency quality of negotiable instruments. Generally speaking, the courts have been quite effective
in implementing this policy through the good faith standard and
no statutory revision seems to be required.
The only exception lies in the case of a close business
relationship between the payee of an instrument, typically a seller
of consumer goods, and the subsequent holder, typically a
financing institution. Quite frequently, the subsequent holder
meets the subjective test of good faith, but it has been felt that
due to his intimate and close business relationship with the payee,
he does not deserve the elevated position of a holder in due
25 See, e.g., Barak, "The Uniform Commercial Code - Commercial Paper, An
Outsider's View, Part I", 3 Israel L. Rev. 7 (1968), at p. 33.
26 See, in general, Barak, ibid., at pp. 33-4.
27 See, in general, Jones v. Gordon (1877), 2 App. Cas. 616 (H.L.); and Benjamin v.
Weinberg, [1956] S.C.R. 553.
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course. Cases denying a holder in due course status to such
financing institutions go back in Canada to Federal Discount
Corp. Ltd. v. St. Pierre.28 Their doctrinal basis has however never
been clear. Professor Littlefield was of the opinion that the effect
of similar consumer financing cases in the United States was to
demonstrate that "[t]he myth that the good faith test is a
subjective one is just that - a myth. Courts have sought to
determine what class of purchasers should enjoy that extraordinary protection and freedom from defenses ...In the run-ofthe-mill commercial case, a test of actual knowledge has been
adequate. ' 29 At the same time, "a close connection between
financing agency and the dealer in a consumer financing transaction will be grounds for finding a duty to police, inquire, or
back-check". 30 The general test of good faith ultimately includes,
according to Professor Littlefield:
...
the observance of the reasonable commercial standards which are appropriate to the business in which the parties are engaged or to the transaction
31
of which the purchase is a part.

Along similar lines, Professor Kripke expressed the opinion
that the "close connectedness doctrine" introduced objective
elements into the good faith standard. 32 Others attempted,
though to my mind unconvincingly, to fit the doctrine into the
traditional good faith standard. Thus, according to Falconbridge,
the circumstances of the close association between the endorsee
and the payee in Federal Discount were "such as to arouse
suspicion of good faith". 33 Levenhurst Investments Ltd. v.
Oakfield Country Club Ltd. stands for the proposition that "[t]he
basis of the St. Pierrecase is that both the dealer and the finance
company were engaged in one business". 34 Also in Bank of
Montreal v. Kon, Kirby J. stated that:
To bring the relationship [between a financer and seller] within the
Federal Discount doctrine the evidence must establish or warrant the
28[1962] OR. 310, 32 D.L.R. (2d) 86 (C.A.).
29 Littlefield, "Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective
Test", 39 So. Cal. L. Rev. 48 (1966), at p. 77.
30 Ibid., at p.74.
31Ibid.
32 Kripke, "Chattel Paper As a Negotiable Specialty Under The Uniform Commercial
Code", 59 Yale L.J. 1208 (1950), at p. 1220.
33 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 632.
34
(1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d) 79 at p. 88, [1965-69]4 N.S.R. 111 at p. 124 (S.C.).
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inference that the [financer] was a party to the wrongful acts of [the seller]
or knew, or ought to have known, the wrongful acts ... 35

Elsewhere I have expressed my disagreement with these views
of Federal Discount.36 My opinion is that the case is neither a
deviation from the good faith standard, nor an example of the
traditional subjective good faith test. The case rather stands for
the proposition that a good faith purchaser must be remote in
relation to the original dealings between the maker and the
payee. "Indeed, the involvement in the arrangement from its
inception is by itself the key to the doctrine. , 37 The doctrine does
not deal with the good faith standard; it is rather concerned with

who may be a good faith purchaser.
With the enactment of Part V (ss. 188 to 192) of the Bills of
Exchange Act, 38 the close connectedness doctrine has been

bypassed in relation to instruments issued under consumer
purchases. Part V effectively abolishes the holder in due course
doctrine in connection with such instruments. 39 None the less,
retail transactions falling outside the ambit of "consumer
purchase ' 40 are not covered by Part V. I believe that with respect
to these transactions the Act should be amended by either
expanding the scope of Part V or by defining those business
relationships between an endorsee and payee which will

disqualify the former from becoming a holder in due course.
The last point to be mentioned here is the holding in due course
35

Bank of Montreal v. Kon (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 609 at p. 630, [19781 2 W.W.R. 503 at

p. 530 (Alta. S.C.T.D.). In general see, also, Crawford, "Consumer Instalment Sales
Financing Since Federal Discount Ltd. v. St. Pierre", 19 U. Tor. L.J. 353 (1969).
36 Geva, "Close Business Relationships Between a Purchase-Money Lender and a Seller
of Goods - Bank of Montreal v. Kon", 3 C.B.L.J. 90 (1978-79).
37 Ibid., at p. 99.
38 R.S.C. 1970, c. 4 (1st Supp.), s. 1.
39 The holder "of a consumer bill or ... note that is marked as required by section 190 ... is
subject to any defence or right of set-off, other than counter-claim, that the purchaser
would have had in an action by the seller": s. 191.
40 Under s. 188:

"consumer purchase" means a purchase, other than a cash purchase, of goods or
services or an agreement to purchase goods or services
(a) by an individual other than for resale or for use in the course of his business,
profession or calling, and

(b) from a person who is engaged in the business of selling or providing those
goods or services;

This does not include for example, a retail purchase for business purposes; cf., e.g.,
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Lively (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 432, 19 N.S.R.

(2d) 400 (S.C.T.D.).
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position of a depositary bank. The subject is governed by s.
165(3) which provides:
(3) Where a cheque is delivered to a bank for deposit to the credit of a
person and the bank credits him with the amount of the cheque, the bank
acquires all the rights and powers of a holder in due course of the cheque.

According to Falconbridge, s. 165(3) was added to the Act in
1966 "after an Alberta decision that a cheque endorsed 'Deposit
only to the account of' "A" and signed "A" was a restrictive
endorsement, and that the bank in which it was deposited was not
a holder in due course". 41 In that case, Imperial Bank of Canada
v. Hays and Earl Ltd.,42 the plaintiff depositary bank received
from its customer a cheque restrictively endorsed for deposit. The
bank credited the customer's account before the cheque had been
cleared, and allowed him to draw on his account. Upon the
cheque being dishonoured, the drawer was allowed to assert
against the bank a defence available to him against the payeecustomer of the plaintiff depositary bank.
Needless to say, the language of s. 165(3) covers more than the
case of a cheque restrictively endorsed for deposit. In fact, s.
165(3) is drafted so as to exempt the depositary bank from all
holding in due course conditions. 43 The Law Reform Commission
of Canada recommended replacing existing s. 165(3) with provisions modeled on Article 4 of the UCC. 44 Such provisions define
the modifying conditions for compliance with the holding in due
course provisions in the case of a depositary bank. They provide
that neither a restrictive endorsement nor the lack of
endorsement shall stand between the depositary bank and the
status of a holder in due course. Furthermore, "value" in the
collection system is given by the depositary bank not by merely
crediting the customer's account, as presently provided for by s.
165(3), but rather by letting the customer actually withdraw
against such credit. This is consistent with the general approach
41Supra, footnote 3 at p. 860.
42 (1962), 35 D.L.R. (2d) 136, 38 W.W.R. 169 (Alta. S.C.). See also Bank of Nova Scotia
v. Budget Motors Ltd., [1966] Que. S.C. 272.
43 For a devastating criticism, see Scott, "The Bank is Always Right: Section 165(3) of the
Bills of Exchange Act and Its Curious Parliamentary History", 19 McGill L.J. 78
(1973).
44 Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Cheque: Some Modernization, Report 11
(Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and Services, 1979), at pp. 31-3, reviewed by Ian F. G.
Baxter in 4 C.B.L.J. 112 (1979-80). The UCC provisions are ss. 4-208 and 4-209. See
also UCC 4-205 (depositary bank's right to supply customer's endorsements; no notice
by non-depositary bank from prior intervening endorsement).
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of Article 3 to "executory consideration" in connection with the
taking for value requirement. 45 No special rule is laid down as to
compliance with the "good faith" and "without notice"
46
element.
I believe that such recommendations are steps in the right
direction. A depositary bank is likely to let its customer withdraw
against provisional credit at least partly on the basis of its expectation that the cheque will be paid, namely on the strength of the
drawer's engagement to honour it. By letting its customer
withdraw against an uncollected cheque, the depositary bank
gives actual value and becomes a good faith purchaser of the
cheque. As such it should be allowed to enforce the drawer's
obligation free from his defences.
However, two limits should be imposed on the depositary
bank's powers as a holder in due course. First, the bank should
not be entitled to exercise its powers before exhausting its
remedies against its customer. For example, suppose Drawer
gives a cheque to Payee who deposits it in his bank account with
Depositary Bank; the latter credits Payee's account and lets him
withdraw funds against the amount so credited; the cheque is
dishonoured. Depositary Bank should not be allowed to proceed
against Drawer before it exhausts its remedies against Payee (its
customer). Credit given in Payee's account is likely to be provisional in any event; Depositary Bank may revoke it as soon as the
cheque is dishonoured. When Drawer has defences against
Payee, there is no reason why Depositary Bank should be
allowed to proceed against Drawer instead of simply revoking the
credit previously given to Payee's account. It is only where
revocation of credit results in an overdraft that Depositary Bank
should be allowed to proceed against Drawer. Moreover, such
overdraft must not be according to an overdraft facility previously
agreed upon between Depositary Bank and its customer (Payee),
and must occur in circumstances where the only effective remedy
of Depositary Bank against Payee is to commence a lawsuit.
Second, the depositary bank should not be allowed to enforce
the drawer's obligation without first obtaining a judgment against
45 See text subsequent to footnote 21, supra.
46 But cf. UCC 4-205(2) and provisions cited as cross reference in the Comment: an intermediary bank, or payor bank which is not a depositary bank, is neither given notice nor
otherwise affected by a restrictive endorsement of any person except the bank's
immediate transferor.
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him. Such a safeguard is important for a drawer who has a bank
account with the depositary bank. Without a judgment, the
amount of
depositary bank should not be permitted to set off the
47
the cheque by merely debiting the drawer's account.
Results of holding in due course
A holder in due course holds the instrument "free from any
defect of title of prior parties, as well as from mere personal
defences available to prior parties among themselves, and may
enforce payment against all parties liable on the [instrument]" (s.
74(b)). I have discussed elsewhere the meaning of "defect of
title" and "mere personal defences". 48 At this point I wish only to
say that a holder in due course holds the instrument free from all
defences to liability of prior parties as well as from prior parties'
equities of ownership. The range of defences not available against
defences, defences
him is frequently characterized as "personal"
49
"in personam" or "relative" defences.
There is a class of defences, falling outside "defect of title",
"relative", or "personal" defences, which is available against a
holder in due course. Such defences are characterized as "real"
or "absolute". 50 According to Falconbridge, "[a] real defence is
so-called because, at least as regards a particular defendant who
is entitled to set it up, it is based upon the nullity of the res
without regard to the merits or demerits of the plaintiff." ' 51 The
availability of such 52a defence against a holder in due course
makes it "absolute".
53
Forgery of one's signature is invariably a real defence.
Discharge of the instrument by payment in due course is regarded
by Falconbridge as another example of a real defence. 54 The
(ii)

47For the UCC holding in due course conditions see ss. 3-302 to 3-304, 1-201(19) and (25),
and 4-208 to 4-209.
48 Geva, "Equities as to Liability on Bills and Notes: Rights of a Holder Not in Due
Course", supra, footnote 8 at pp. 61-72.
49 See, e.g.,
Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 667; Cowen on The Law of Negotiable
Instruments in South Africa, 4th ed., Cowen and Gering eds. (1966), pp. 269, 272.
50 See, e.g., Falconbridge, ibid., at p. 666; Cowen, ibid., at p. 268.
51Falconbridge, ibid., at p. 668.
52 Cowen, supra, footnote 49 at p. 268.
53Subject to an explicit estoppel exception: s. 49(1).
54Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 668. However, since payment in due course cannot
take place before maturity of the instrument (s. 139(2)), one who takes the instrument
after such payment may not be a holder in due course. See s. 56(1)(a) requiring the
taking of the instrument before maturity.
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following is an analysis of two other types of defence falling
within the category.
(a) Defences relatingto the nullity of the obligation
Absolute incapacity of the defendant to make a binding
contract is considered a real defence. 55 Also, notwithstanding that
as a general rule in English law the contract of an infant or minor
is voidable and not void, infancy is a real defence to liability on a
56
bill or note.
A more frequently discussed real defence is the defence of
"non estfactum" (NEF), or "it is not his deed". This defence is
based on fraud, the effect of which is so strong as to make the
contract void and not merely voidable. The fraud must be in
relation to the material content of the instrument, its character or
its nature; mere fraud in inducement, or concealment of essential
terms of the contract is not sufficient. To invoke the defence, the
signer must have been led to believe that he was not signing a
negotiable instrument at all; 57 the fraud must be "in the factum"
and not "in the inducement".
The leading case is Foster v. Mackinnon. 58 In that case,
defendant believed he was signing a guarantee but, in fact, he
signed as an endorser of an instrument. Byles J. found that
defendant "was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as
to the actual contents of the instrument". 59 He could therefore
assert his defence against a holder in due course. The case "has
been criticized on the facts on the ground that the liability of a
guarantor and that of an endorser are so similar that Mackinnon's
signing as endorser under the belief that he was signing as
guarantor was not a case of his signing a contract 'of a nature
altogether different' from the contract he intended to sign." 60 Yet
apart from the particular facts of the case, its rule of law has not
been in doubt for a long period. A good example of the use of the
NEF defence is the case of a consumer 61 who was fraudulently led
55Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 668.
56 Ibid., at p. 547. For a recent American perspective on another real defence based on the
nullity of the obligation, see Rosen, "U.C.C. 3-305(2)(b): What Degree of Duress?", 21
S.T.L.J. 47 (1980).
57See, e.g.,
Nordic Acceptance Ltd. v.Switzer, [1965] 2 O.R. 373, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 600
(H.C.J.), affd 55 D.L.R. (2d) 385n (C.A.).
58(1869), L.R. 4 C.P. 704.
59
Ibid., at p.713.
60 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 673.
61Of course, consumer instruments are presently covered by Part V of the Act. For
explaining the NEF defence the old cases are still relevant.
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to believe that the goods had been given to her for "advertisement", who "did not know she was signing or intended to sign
was
what is claimed to be a note", and who thought her signature
62
a mere acknowledgement of the delivery of the goods.
This traditional framework for NEF suffered a serious setback
in the decision of Lord Denning M.R. in Gallie v. Lee. 63 First,
Lord Denning was very critical of the distinction between class
and contents. His view was that "it is not a sensible distinction":
A mistake as to contents may be just as fundamental as a mistake as to class
and character. ... Suppose a man signs a paper without reading it. He is told
it is a bill of exchange for £100; whereas it is in truth a bill of exchange for a
much larger sum of £10,000. . . . The maker there made a fundamental
mistake but it was only a mistake as to the contents of the document ... for it
was, in any case, a bill of exchange. It is agreed ... that in that case he
cannot plead that it was not his document. 64

He found that the distinction between class and contents is often
a question of degree: "[Tlhe distinction is not really a distinction
at all. A document takes its class and character from its contents;

and a mistake as to the one is often also a mistake as to the
other.' '65
In addition, Lord Denning concluded that one who signs a
document owes a duty of care to the entire world:
Whenever a man of full age and understanding, who can read and write,
signs a legal document which is put before him for signature - by which I
mean a document which, it is apparent on the face of it, is intended to have
legal consequences - then, if he does not take the trouble to read it but
signs it as it is, relying on the word of another as to its character or contents
or effect, he cannot be heard to say that it is not his document. By his
conduct in signing it he has represented, to all those into whose hands it
may come, that it is his document .... 66

This means that the defence of NEF can be met by an argument
based on the signer's negligence. In connection with bills and
notes, the possibility of such a rule had already emerged in
Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co. v. Bragg.67 However, it
appears from Foster v. Mackinnon68 itself, that the negligence
62 American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 240 N.E. 2d 886 (Ohio App. 1968). See also Nordic
Acceptance Ltd. v. Switzer, supra, footnote 57.
63 [1969] 1 All E.R. 1062 (C.A.), affd [1971] A.C. 1004 sub nom. Saunders v. Anglia
Building Society.
64 Ibid., at p. 1067.
65 Ibid., at p. 1068.
66
Ibid., at p. 1072.
67 [191111 K.B. 489 (C.A.).
68 Supra, footnote 58.
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referred to there is only the negligence of a signing party who
"knows what he is doing", namely one who is signing what is
known to him to be a blank negotiable instrument. 69 In this
respect, Lord Denning's innovation is twofold. First, he established the principle that negligence is an answer to a NEF defence
in connection with all documents, not merely negotiable instruments. Secondly, according to Lord Denning, a signer who does
not read carefully the document put before him for signature may
find himself liable on his signature even if he did not know what
he was doing, provided there was no evidence of incapacity. This
means that in the framework established by Gallie v. Lee a signer
who was not aware that he was signing a negotiable instrument
would not be discharged if he was careless in signing the
document.
The House of Lords unanimously affirmed7 ° the Court of
Appeal's decision and, subject to a few modifications, gave its
approval to the tenor of Lord Denning's judgment. It held that,
for the NEF defence to apply, there must be a radical and fundamental difference between the document signed, and the
document intended to be signed. 71 The class/contents distinction
was found to be "helpful in some cases, but [capable of
producing] wrong results if it were applied as a rigid rule for all
cases". 72 The law lords were also agreed that, while no duty of
care is owed by a signer to a third party relying on the signed
document, in the absence of some form of incapacity on his part,
a signer cannot establish a successful NEF defence without
proving that he acted carefully in signing the document. 73
It is noteworthy that Gallie v. Lee is consistent with the
solution adopted by the drafters of the UCC:
§3-305. Rights of a Holder in Due Course
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the
instrument free from

69 Supra, footnote 58 at p. 712. The negligence of the signer of a negotiable instrument is a
factor because "[t]hese instruments are not only assignable, but they form part of the
currency of the country. A qualification of the general rule is necessary to protect
innocent transferees for value", ibid. "The general rule" referred to in the last sentence
is apparently that negligence is no answer to a NEF defence.
70 Saunders v. Anglia Building Society, [1971] A.C. 1004.
71Ibid., at pp. 1016-17, per Lord Reid; pp. 1018-19, per Lord Hodson; p. 1022, per
Viscount Dilhorne; p. 1026, per Lord Wilberforce; and p. 1039, per Lord Pearson.
72 Ibid., at p. 1039, per Lord Pearson.
73 Ibid., at p. 1019, per Lord Hodson; p. 1023, per Viscount Dilhorne; pp. 1026-7, per
Lord Wilberforce; and pp. 1036-8, per Lord Pearson.
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(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has
not dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the
instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
the instrument.

Subsection (c) deals with the NEF defence. Under that subsection, the fraud which renders the instrument void as against a
holder in due course is not limited to the "character" of the
instrument; it could also relate to "its essential terms".
Moreover, to succeed, the defendant must prove not only lack of
knowledge, but also lack of "reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge". This suggests that the signer's negligence, expressed

in his failure to know notwithstanding the existence of "reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge", is an answer to a NEF
defence.
It is far from certain whether, as a matter of policy, a defence
based on the nullity of the signer's obligation should be available
at all against a holder in due course.
It is only the accident of historical development which renders a contract
void for mistake and voidable for fraud. Why should this distinction be
carried into the law of bills of exchange? Are the material grounds for
distinguishing between a void and a voidable obligation in the law of
contract also material in the law of bills?
Are they consistent with the
74
nature of a bill as a negotiable instrument?

There is no unequivocal answer to these questions. Likewise, it is
far from certain whether Gallie v. Lee is necessarily a step
forward. It appears to balance carefully the interests of the signer
and those of the third party, and thus appears to be a substantial

improvement over the mechanical rules which preceded it. Yet by
repudiating the distinction between class and contents and

expanding the role of negligence as an answer to a NEF defence,
74 Barak, supra, footnote 25 at pp. 38-9.
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the decision introduces uncertainty. Undoubtedly, in the law of
bills and notes this is not a desirable result.
Recent NEF judicial developments in Canada are not encouraging. First, there is confusion as to whether Gallie v. Lee is to be
followed, 75 or whether it would be better for the orthodox class/contents distinction to continue. 76 Secondly, some courts have
erroneously considered the NEF defence in situations involving
no third-party interests. 77 For example, in Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce v. Dura Wood Preservers Ltd. ,78 a guarantor
was innocently misled by the creditor as to the amount of the
guaranteed debt. When he was sued by the misrepresenting
creditor on the guarantee, the guarantor pleaded NEF. It was
found that he had signed the document without reading it. His
defence failed and he was held liable for the full amount of the
79
guaranteed debt.
All this does not give much hope for a successful judicial
resolution of NEF issues. A legislative intervention seems
80
entirely warranted.
(b) Absence of delivery of incomplete instruments
"Delivery", namely the "transfer of possession, actual or
constructive, from one person to another" (s. 2), is essential to
75 In this direction see, e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Kanadian Kiddee
Photo Ltd., [1979] 3 W.W.R. 256 (B.C.S.C.); Custom Motors Ltd. v. Dwinell (1975), 61
D.L.R. (3d) 342 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.).
76 As was done in Bank of Montreal v. Fechter, [1975] W.W.D. 138 (Sask. C.A.). The
question of which path to follow (Gallie v. Lee or previous law) was left open in
Commercial Credit Corp. Ltd. v. Carroll Bros. Ltd. (1970), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 201 (Man.
Q.B.), affd 20 D.L.R. (3d) 504n (Man. C.A.).
77
See, e.g., Hurlburt v. Hunter, [1975] 2 W.W.R. 230 (Alta. S.C.T.D.); and Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Kanadian Kiddee Photo Ltd., supra, footnote 75. For a
summary of Canadian NEF developments in general see J. S. Ziegel and B. Geva,
Commercial and Consumer Transactions (Toronto, Emond-Montgomery Ltd., 1981),
pp. 106-8.
78 (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 78, 14 B.C.L.R. 338 (S.C.).
79 The correct view is that the signer's negligence "should surely not be relevant as against
the very party who was responsible for his deception": S.M. Waddams, The Law of
Contracts (Toronto, Canada Law Book Ltd., 1977), p. 205 at note 64. The case was thus
wrongly decided.
80 NEF may be raised in connection with all types of documents. Therefore, its regulation
appears to fall within provincial legislative jurisdiction (British North America Act,
1867 (U.K.), c. 3, s. 92(13)). None the less, in the interest of constitutionally securing
the applicability of any reforming statute to bills and notes, NEF legislation purporting
to apply to negotiable instruments should be federal (British North America Act, 1867,
s. 91(18)).
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render effective a negotiable instrument or the contract of any
party to it (ss. 2, 39, 178). In order that any party to the
instrument may be liable, he must not only have signed it but also
have delivered it. Until delivery to a holder, the contract on the
instrument is incomplete and revocable.
However, the defence of absence of delivery is not available
against a holder in due course. Under s. 40(2):
(2) Where the bill is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid
delivery of the bill by all parties prior to him, so as to make them liable to
him, is conclusively presumed.

81
This suggests that absence of delivery is not a real defence.
However, s. 40(2) applies only with respect to negotiable instruments which were complete in form when they left the signer's
possession. 82 As to incomplete instruments, ss. 31 and 32 should
also be considered. These provisions read as follows:

31. Where a simple signature on a blank paper is delivered by the signer
in order that it may be converted into a bill, it operates as a prima facie
authority to fill it up as a complete bill for any amount, using the signature
for that of the drawer or acceptor, or an endorser; and, in like manner,
when a bill is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession of
it has aprimafacieauthority to fill up the omission in any way he thinks fit.
32.(1) In order that any instrument referred to in section 31 when
completed may be enforceable against any person who became a party
thereto prior to its completion, it must be filled up within a reasonable time,
and strictly in accordance with the authority given; but where any such
instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is
valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if
it had been filled up within a reasonable time and strictly in accordance with
the authority given.
(2) Reasonable time within the meaning of this section is a question of
fact.

Under the proviso of s. 32(1), a holder in due course holds the
instrument free from prior parties' defences based on
unauthorized completion of the instrument. It has however
consistently been held that there is nothing in this proviso to
enable a holder in due course to defeat the defence of want of
delivery of an incomplete instrument. Accordingly, "[t]he
defence of want of delivery [of an incomplete instrument] is a real
81But see McKenty v. Vanhorenback (1911), 21 Man. R. 360 (C.A.); absence of initial
delivery (or issue) may be raised against a holder in due course. The case is criticized by
Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 538.
82 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 535; cf. Baxendale v. Bennett (1878), 3 Q.B.D. 525

(C.A.).

1981-82]

Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act

287

defence available against the whole world, not merely a defect
of
83
title which cannot be set up against a holder in due course".
Furthermore, "delivery" in connection with ss. 31 and 32 has
been construed quite narrowly. As explained below, these provisions apply only to cases in which an incomplete instrument has
been delivered in order that it may be completed so as to be
issued or negotiated. In this situation it is proper to consider the
transfer of the instrument by the signer as "delivery". The provisions do not apply to cases in which an incomplete instrument has
been delivered by the signer for a purpose other than issue or
negotiation. In such a case there is no "delivery" of an instrument
by the signer. The proviso of s. 32(1) protects a holder in due
course from a defence based on the unauthorized completion of
the instrument, but not from a defence based either on the
absence of delivery or on the fact that delivery was made for a
purpose other than issue or negotiation.
The leading case is Smith v. Prosser.84 In this case, the
defendant placed two blank notes signed by him as maker in the
hands of his attorney. The instructions given to the attorney were
to retain the documents until the defendant gave him new instructions. The new instructions were to relate to the issuance of the
documents as promissory notes for the purpose of raising money
upon them, as well as to the amounts by which they should be
filled up. No new instructions were ever given. The attorney
fraudulently filled up the documents and used them as promissory
notes for his own purposes. In an action by the payee it was
concluded that the defendant had entrusted the blank signed
forms to the attorney only in the attorney's character as custodian, without giving him authority to issue them as promissory
notes. It was therefore held that the defendant was not liable.
Plaintiff in Smith v. Prosser was the payee of the notes; "there
was no negotiation to him after completion, and the case ... was
not within the proviso to s. 32".85 None the less, "[aill the
members of the Court of Appeal who heard the case put their
decision ... on the broad ground that the documents had never
been delivered by the signer with the intention that they might be
converted into complete notes". 86 Vaughan Williams L.J.
83 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 536.
84 [1907] 2 K.B. 735 (C.A.).
85Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 537.
86 Ibid.
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explicitly stated that "in the absence of a delivery of notes to an
agent with the intention that they shall be negotiated, or at any
rate that the agent shall have power to negotiate them, the signer
is not responsible even to a bona fide holderfor value". 87 Fletcher
Moulton L.J. was even more specific. Relying particularly on the
opening clause of s. 31, his view was that ss. 31 and 32 are "based
upon the doctrine of common law estoppel" and that therefore
"the intention that the document should be converted into a bill
of exchange [is] essential
in order to render the maker liable"
88
under these provisions.
This construction of ss. 31 and 32 was followed in Canadian
cases where Smith v. Prosserwas extended to situations involving
a signed blank instrument delivered to an agent with authority to
fill it up and negotiate it on the occurrence of a future event.8 9 In
each case the event had never happened and the agent had fraudulently filled up the instrument and used it for his own purposes.
In each case a holder in due course failed to recover on the instrument. The effect of these cases is that the proviso of s. 32(1)
protects a holder in due course in cases where an agent has
exceeded his limited authority as to completion, such as where he
writes in a higher sum than was authorized. The proviso does not
protect such a holder where the agent's authority to complete and
issue was subject to an unfulfilled condition subsequent. 90
The law does not appear to me to be in a satisfactory condition.
As a general rule, one who entrusts a signed blank form of a
negotiable instrument to another should bear the loss resulting
from his bailee's fraud. In particular, where a blank signed
instrument is given to an agent with the authority to fill it up and
issue it either following further instructions, or on the occurrence
of a certain event, one who takes the instrument in good faith
should be able to overcome a defence based on the issue or
negotiation without authority. It is hard to see why such a third
party should not be protected where the agent fills up the
instrument and issues it without waiting either for the signer's
instructions or for the occurrence of the event. The third party's
87 Supra, footnote 84 at p. 745, emphasis added.
88 Supra, footnote 84 at p. 753.
89 See, e.g., Hubbert v. Home Bank of Canada (1910), 20 O.L.R. 651 (Div. Ct.); Ray and
Jarvis v. Willson (1911), 45 S.C.R. 401; and Campbell v. Bourque (1914), 17 D.L.R.
262, 28 W.L.R. 148 (Man. C.A.).
90 These cases are criticized by Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 539.
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position towards the agent does not appear to be significantly
different from that of a bona fide third party towards an agent
with a limited authority, namely an agent who was authorized to
fill the incomplete instrument with a figure up to a certain amount
and then to issue or negotiate it but who exceeded his authority
and put in a higher sum. In both cases, and not only in the latter,
the loss should be allocated to the signer. Smith v. Prosser is
premised on the obsolete notion that no duty of care to the public
is owed by a document signer, 91 a position that does not reflect
sound commercial policy.
The drafters of the American Code got rid of this anomaly.
Under s. 3-115, the unauthorized completion of "a paper whose
contents at the time of signing show that it is intended to become
an instrument", is subject to the rules as to material alteration,
''even though the paper was not delivered by the maker or
drawer". Under the rules as to material alteration, when an
incomplete instrument has been completed, "[a] subsequent
holder in due course" may enforce it as completed (UCC 3407(3)). A party may be precluded from asserting the defence of
material alteration even as against one not holder in due course
(UCC 3-407(2)(a)).
The treatment of real defences in the Act is far from satisfactory. There is neither a comprehensive delineation of these
defences nor is there an adequate statement as to the holder in
due course's position in relation to them. In addition, neither the
Act nor the case law reflects consideration or formulation of an
adequate doctrinal or policy framework within which the courts
can function to reach satisfactory solutions.
(iii) The payee as a holder in due course
The special position of the holder in due course has always
been explained by the currency quality of the negotiable
instrument. 92 Thus, to be a holder in due course one must be a
bona fide purchaser, a remote party to the actual
dealings which
93
originally gave rise to the negotiable instrument.
It follows that typically, a payee will not qualify as a holder in
91These premises as to the lack of the duty of care emerge particularly from the judgment
of Vaughan Williams L.J., supra, footnote 84 at p. 746. For the obsolescence of these
notions see the preceding section dealing with NEF and Part III, text and footnotes 21419, infra.
92 This explanation goes back to Miller v. Race (1758), 1 Burr. 452, 97 E.R. 398.
93For the distinction between "remote" and "immediate" parties, cf. s. 40(1).
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due course. In general a payee takes the instrument as a direct
promisee, rather than as a purchaser. 94 There are, however, situations where a payee acquires an instrument as a purchaser. For
example, it is not uncommon for a buyer from a retailer, who
borrows money from a bank to pay for the purchase, to pay for
the goods with a bank draft (i.e., a bill of exchange whose drawer
is a bank). It was well established in pre-Act English case law that
the payee in such a situation is a purchaser of the instrument. The
one who procured the issuance of the draft payable to the order
of another, the buyer in the previous example, was called the
"remitter". He was treated in those cases as the first owner of the
instrument, who was in a position "to confer title ... upon the
payee". 95 Can such a payee qualify as a holder in due course?
The English pre-Act cases 96 dealing with a situation where the
remitter defaulted on his obligation to the drawer-bank, gave an
affirmative answer. They specifically held that where the payee of
a bank draft acquires it for value, in good faith, and without
notice of any defence available to the drawer bank against the
remitter, such a payee enjoys a holder in due course status. He
may enforce the drawer's obligation irrespective of the latter's
defences against the remitter.
The attribution of holder in due course status to the payee on a
bank draft is consistent with the view that prior to the delivery of
the instrument to the payee, the remitter was its owner. Having a
derivative title to the instrument, the payee is a remote party to
the actual dealings which originally gave rise to the instrument.
True, such a payee is the named promisee on the bill, and since
only he can become its first holder, the sale of the instrument to
him is a far cry from free circulation of commercial paper. None
the less, the payee acquires his rights under the bank draft by sale
from the remitter, rather than by virtue of a direct relationship
with the drawer. Indeed, as has been demonstrated by courts in
the United States, the purchasing remitter's ownership of the bill
payable to the order of a third person is not only the basis for the
94Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course", 36 Yale L.J. 608 (1927), at p. 631.
95 Munroe v. Bordier(1849),8 C.B. 862 at p. 872,137 E.R. 747.
9Munroe v. Bordier, ibid., and Poirier v. Morris (1853), 2 EL. & BL. 89, 118 E.R. 702
(Q.B.). See also Watson v. Russell (1862), 3 B. & S. 34, 122 E.R. 14 (Q.B.), affd 5 B. &
S. 968, 122 E.R. 1090 (Ex. Ch.). See in general, Aigler, supra, footnote 94 at pp.
609-11.
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payee's holder in due course status but is also the foundation for
the remitter's own rights under the instrument:
Suppose, upon a rightful tender of the instrument by the remitter or by
the agent of the issuer to the payee, the payee refuses to accept it, what are
the rights of the party in possession against the signers thereof? Or, again,
suppose that after such refusal by the payee to accept the tendered instrument, the party in possession transfers it for value to some person other
than the payee, what are the rights of such transferee against the signers of
the instrument? Where a purchasing remitter is in possession after the
payee has refused to accept it, or, where the purchasing remitter has
decided not to tender the instrument to the payee, the remitter is the owner
thereof, although not the holder, but, as owner, the remitter has a right to
recover from the maker or drawer by an action on the instrument ... 97

The remitter's ownership thus provides a basis for a comprehensive framework dealing with rights in relation to bank drafts;
the payee's holder in due course position fits easily into this
framework. None the less, the orthodox view is that the authority
of the pre-Act cases supporting the holder in due course status of
the payee on a bank draft has not survived the enactment of the
United Kingdom Bills of Exchange Act and that a payee may not
be a holder in due course. 98 The only possible exception to this is
the position of a payee on a bill of exchange as towards the
acceptor. Being a remote party in relation to him, such a payee
"is not liable to be defeated either by defects of title or by any
personal defence which the acceptor may set up against the
drawer". 99 At the same time, as against the drawer or the maker a
payee may not be a holder in due course.
The orthodox view is based on three leading cases, as well as on
the language of the Act. I will first discuss these authorities, then
consider the challenge presented by two Canadian cases, and
finally examine the legislative solution under the American UCC.
I will argue that the UCC solution goes beyond the restoration of
the law to its pre-U.K. Act condition and that it rather constitutes
a departure from existing principles of law. This departure does
not appear to me to be justifiable, so reformers should examine
the UCC model with great caution.
The first decision cited in support of the proposition that a
payee may not be a holder in due course is Lewis v. Clay. 10° In
97 W. E. Britton, Bills and Notes (1961), p. 179.

98 See, e.g., Byles on Bills of Exchange, 24th ed., M. Megrah and F. R. Ryder eds.,
(London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1979), pp. 33, 185.
99 Ibid., at p. 199.
100 (1897), 67 L.J.Q.B. 224, 77 L.T. 653.
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that case, one of two joint makers of a promissory note attempted
to meet the payee's action with the defence that his signature had
been obtained by the co-maker's fraud. He was successful in
pleading NEF. 1°1 In his judgment, Lord Russell C.J. also
considered the possible status of the payee as a holder in due
course:
It will be apparent from a consideration of the facts of the case that the
plaintiff was not a "holder in due course" at all, but that he was, in fact,
simply the named payee ... Further ... "a holder in due course" is a person
to whom, after its completion by and as between the immediate parties, the
bill or note has been negotiated. In the present case the plaintiff is named as
payee on the face of the promissory note, and therefore, is one of the
immediate parties. The promissory notes have, in fact, never been
negotiated within the meaning of the Act.102

It is hard to tell from this statement how much the decision
turned on "the facts of the case" and how much it turned on the
proposition that "the plaintiff is named as payee ... and therefore,
is one of the immediate parties" who can never be a holder in due
course. 10 3 In any event, it is important to note the assumption of
Lord Russell that only one who takes an instrument by negotiation can qualify as a holder in due course.
Under the Act, a holder in due course must take the instrument
by negotiation (s. 56(1)(b)). "A bill payable to order is
negotiated by the endorsement of the holder completed by delivery" (s. 60(3)). Since the payee under an instrument is always its
first holder, 1°4 he cannot take it from a previous holder as
required by s. 60(3). Nor does he take the instrument from the
first owner by "endorsement". 10 5 Hence, the argument goes,
since a payee cannot acquire the instrument by "negotiation" as
defined in s. 60(3), he can never qualify as a holder in due course.
It is, however, plausible to suppose that in drafting the statute
the drafters of the English Act had in mind the typical fact
situation where the payee is an immediate party to the transaction, and that they did not consider the situation of a payee who is
a remote party. The statutory language could therefore be simply
101
102
103
104

For NEF and its availability against a holder in due course, see section (ii), supra.
Lewis v. Clay (1897), 67 L.J.Q.B. 224 at p. 227, 77 L.T. 653 at p. 656.
Ibid., emphasis added.
"Holder" under s. 1 is "the payee or endorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of
it".
105 Cf. footnote 95 and text, supra; the payee taking the instrument from the remitter
takes it from the first owner but not by endorsement.
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the result of an oversight rather than of a careful scheme under
which a payee may not be a holder in due course. Moreover, as a
matter of statutory construction, the definition of "negotiation"
in connection with instruments payable to order should not necessarily be read so as to be confined to the wording of s. 60(3). The
general concept of "negotiation" is broadly defined in s. 60(1) as
a transfer of a bill "in such a manner as to constitute the transferee a holder of the bill". Acquisition by negotiation under s.
60(1) denotes the existence of a derivative title in the hands of the
holder, the remoteness of the holder-acquirer from the underlying transaction, or the manner of becoming "the mercantile
owner of the instrument"' 1 6 by transfer. The next two subsections
of s. 60 can then be considered to deal with negotiation by a
holder, or to constitute examples of the most typical cases of
"negotiation". Section 60(2) deals with the typical negotiation of
a bearer instrument, and s. 60(3) deals with that of one payable to
order. These subsections should not be taken, however, to
qualify the generality of s. 60(1) or to exhaust all cases of "negotiation". Accordingly, there is room for more instances of "negotiation" not provided for by subsecs. (2) and (3) of s. 60, which are
none the less within the broad framework of s. 60(1).107
Lewis v. Clay 10 8 is therefore far from being unequivocal in
establishing a general proposition as to the inability of a payee to
become a holder in due course. By insisting on "negotiation" the
case could be regarded as merely reaffirming the position that a
holder in due course must be a purchaser of the instrument. On
its facts the case did not involve such a purchaser.
The second case cited in support of the view that a payee may
not become a holder in due course is Herdman v. Wheeler. 1' 9 In
this case, a maker of a promissory note placed a signed blank note
in the hands of a middleman instructing him to arrange for a loan
(to the maker) known to come from a certain lender. The maker
instructed the middleman to fill his (the middleman's) own name
as payee and to insert a specific sum of money. The middleman
defied the instructions, put the actual lender's name as the payee,
put a higher sum, delivered the note so filled to the lender, and
106 For this definition of holder, see Chalmers, supra, footnote 15 at pp. 7-8.
107 See in general, Note [1929] Camb. L.J. 85.
108Supra, footnote 102.
109[190211 K.B. 361.
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then converted the proceeds of the loan so received to his own
use. The lender, the payee on the note, sued the maker and
claimed a holder in due course status.
Payee failed. However, "[t]his case ... which has been so
frequently cited for the position that payees may not be holders in
due course instead of so deciding, expressly declares the contrary
to be the fact". 1 0 The court stated that it was "not prepared to
hold that a payee of a note can never be a holder in due
course"."1 It also held that whether "the payee of a note may be
a holder in due course ... depends on the actual state of facts as
between him and the maker". On the particular facts of the case,
the court found "much to support [the] argument" that payee
dealt directly with the maker and thus there was privity of
contract between them.1 1 2 Since payee and maker were
immediate parties to the underlying loan agreement, payee could
not claim that the note had been negotiated to him so as to
overcome the defence of unauthorized completion of the
instrument under s. 32(1).113 Indeed, as the payee was not a
purchaser of the instrument but rather a direct party to a contract
with the maker, he could not become a holder in due course.
Unfortunately, the decision went slightly further than holding
that on the facts the payee was not a holder in due course.
Channell J. specifically stated that "negotiated" in the proviso of
s. 32(1) "meant transferred by one holder to another". 114 This
appears to mean that apart from the particular facts of the case,
the court was of the opinion that as a matter of construction of the
Act, "negotiation" cannot take place where the transferee is the
payee, since his transferor is not a holder. Channell J. explicitly
limited his statement regarding the meaning of "negotiated" to its
use in s. 32(1), dealing with the specific question of unauthorized
completion. He did not purport to apply this interpretation to the
term as used in s. 56(1)(b) dealing with acquiring a holder in due
course status.1 1 5 Yet, the problem of a payee as a holder in due
course can arise also in the context of s. 32(1). Suppose A takes
from B a blank cheque for value. The cheque is signed by B who
110 Aigler, supra, footnote 94 at p. 616.
111 Supra, footnote 109 at p. 372.
112 Supra, footnote 109 at p. 374.
113 Section 32(1) is reproduced in section (ii), text which follows footnote 82, supra.
114 Supra, footnote 109 at p. 376.
115 A point emphasized by Byles, supra, footnote 98 at p. 198.
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instructs A to fill it with a certain sum of money and with his (A's)
name as payee. Exceeding his authority, A inserts a higher sum,
fills C's name in as payee, and gives the completed instrument to
bona fide C, who takes it for value. C is a purchaser of B's
instrument1 16 who could qualify under the pre-Act cases as a
holder in due course. It is incongruous to argue that he qualifies
as a holder in due course under s. 56(1)(b) but not under s. 32(1).
The construction given by the court to "negotiated" in s. 32(1) in
Herdman v. Wheeler is thus quite unfortunate. On its facts, the
case did not involve a payee who could be a holder in due course.
There was no need to go beyond that.
The third case and probably the highest authority frequently
cited in support of the proposition that a payee may not become a
holder in due course is the House of Lords' decision in R. E.
Jones Ltd. v. Waring and Gillow Ltd." 7 In this case a debtor of
the payee fraudulently induced the drawer to draw a cheque
payable to the order of the payee for a consideration alleged by
the debtor to be given to the drawer by the payee. The drawer
placed the cheque in the hands of the debtor who in fact used it to
pay his own debt to the payee. The cheque was paid. When the
drawer discovered the fraud he sued the payee. Payee claimed a
holder in due course status.
Payee failed. According to Professor Aigler, on its facts the
case was correctly decided since the drawer had intended to deal
with the payee. "However this may be, the generality of the
language as to the situation of a payee under the Bills of
Exchange Act leaves it very difficult for any other and therefore
inferior English court to reach what is believed to be the sound
conclusion."'1 18 Falconbridge believes that "the case appears to be
open to criticism, as being based on technical and not wholly
convincing reasoning, and as reaching a conclusion which is not
entirely satisfactory from the practical point of view, because
there are situations in which a payee should logically be as fully
protected as a subsequent holder"." 9 He none the less acknowl116

Cf. Smith v. Prosser, [1907] 2 K.B. 735 (C.A.), discussed at length in section (ii),
supra. Vaughan Williams L.J. regarded plaintiff/payee as a purchaser of the note
(ibid., at p. 744) but "agree[d] with the contention ...that [s. 32(1)] does not really
apply in the present case" (ibid., at p. 742).

117 [1926] A.C. 670.

118 Aigler, supra, footnote 94 at p. 619.
119 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at pp. 625-6.
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edges that "Jones v. Waring has been followed in Canada as being
20
settled law". 1
Indeed, the generality of some language in Jones v. Waring is

quite troublesome. Viscount Cave, for example, explicitly
expressed the view that the expression "holder in due course"
does not include the original payee. 2 1 Lord Shaw was more
cautious: "It was never a negotiated cheque ... The cheque never
went into the circle by transfer or indorsation, and it is in these
circumstances ... inappropriate to use language as to 'a holder in

due course' as applicable to the position of a direct payee of a
cheque". 22 Acquisition by negotiation appeared to be necessary
for acquiring a holder in due course status. But whether "negotiation" requires the holder's endorsement as an essential element
thereto does not emerge clearly from the decision.

The orthodox view is that the decision settled it "once and for
all" that a payee cannot become a holder in due course. 123 Propo-

nents of this view often state that a payee who takes the
instrument on the conditions specified in s. 56(1) "save that he
took the instrument as payee instead of having it 'negotiated' to
him",124 "has the same rights [as a holder in due course] vis-A-vis

a remote party such as the acceptor". 1 5 It is, however, not
entirely clear on what basis this proposition rests. Ordinarily, a
payee on a bill of exchange, being direct promisee of the drawer's

promise, is not a purchaser of the instrument. As such he cannot
become a holder in due course.

It is arguable, notwithstanding Aigler, 126 that under the preAct cases, payee in Jones v. Waring could qualify as a holder in
120 Ibid., at p. 625. The leading case in this direction, according to Falconbridge, is
Gallagher v. Murphy, [1928] 4 D.L.R. 618, 34 O.W.N. 204 (S.C. App. Div.), revd on
another point, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 124, [19291 S.C.R. 288. See also Niagara Finance Co.
Ltd. v. Avco FinancialServices Ltd., [1975] 2 W.W.R. 352 at p. 355 (Alta. Dist. Ct.),
disagreeing with Dominion Bank v. Fassel & BaglierConstrc. Co., [1955] 4 D.L.R. 161
at p. 165 (Ont. C.A.), on the ground that the court "did not consider ... Jones v.
Waring" and concluding that the original payee could be a holder in due course. See, in
general, I. Baxter, Law of Banking, 3rd ed. (1981), p. 75. The view that "the
immediate holder ... cannot be a holder in due course" was recently repeated (without
being determined) by Mr. Justice Laskin C.J.C. in Mollot v. Monette (1982), 128
D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.), at p. 578.
121 Jones v. Waring, supra, footnote 117 at p. 680.
122 Supra, footnote 117 at p. 687, emphasis added.
123 Byles, supra, footnote 98 at p. 197.
124 Supra, footnote 98.
125 Supra, footnote 98 at p. 199.
126 See footnote 102 and preceding text, supra.
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due course. It is true that the drawer intended to deal with the
payee; however, the payee did not intend to deal with the drawer
but simply purchased the drawer's cheque from his debtor. 127 It is
plausible to argue that whether a "good faith purchase" exists
should be determined from the payee's viewpoint. In any event,
no matter how the particular case should have been decided, it is
important to take note of its unusual fact situation. In light of
these facts, to draw general firm conclusions of law from the case
is unwarranted.
There has been some case law in Canada which suggests that a
payee may be a holder in due course. For example, in Johnson v.
Johnson128 the drawer owed money to a third party, and the third
party owed money to the payee, so the third party requested the
drawer to pay him by a cheque made payable to the payee. The
third party delivered the cheque to the payee. It was held by the
trial court that the payee was a holder in due course who could
enforce payment against the drawer, notwithstanding the latter's
defences against the third party.1 29 Payee in that case was a
remote party, effectively the purchaser of the instrument from
the third party. The decision is, therefore, perfectly consistent
with the view that a payee/purchaser of the instrument may be a
holder in due course.
Ultimately, Johnson v. Johnson did not turn out to be a
challenge to the authority of Jones v. Waring. In fact, it was
finally acknowledged by the Appellate Division of the Alberta
Supreme Court that "Jones v. Waring ... which was not cited by
counsel and was unfortunately overlooked, where it was held that
the original payee of a cheque is not a 'holder in due course' ...
must now be accepted as the last word on the subject, at all events
30
where the facts are similar to those in question in that case".1
The Appellate Division affirmed the earlier decision but on the
basis that the cheque in Johnson v. Johnson was payable to payee
or bearer, and as such constituted a bearer instrument trans127 See facts, footnote 117 and subsequent text, supra.
128 [1928] 2 D.L.R. 531, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 774 (Alta. S.C.), affd [1928] 2 D.L.R. 912,
[192812 W.W.R. 63 (App. Div.).
129 The third party was instructed not to give the cheque to the payee "until further
instructions from [drawer] that funds were available". He gave him the cheque
notwithstanding these instructions without telling him "of the condition attached to the
delivery of the cheque": [1928] 2 D.L.R. 531 at p. 532, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 774 at p. 775
(Alta. S.C. App. Div.).
130 Johnson v. Johnson, [192812 D.L.R. 912, [1928] 2 W.W.R. 63.
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ferable by delivery alone. 131 This view as to the classification of an
instrument payable to payee or bearer as a bearer instrument is
consistent with the position of the American UCC 132 as well as
with Chalmers' opinion, 133 although the only case cited by him in
his commentary on "bearer" is not unequivocal. 134
A more recent case finding a payee to be a holder in due course
is Central Factors Corporation Ltd. v. Bragg.135 Here cheques
were signed by an agent defrauding his principal (the named
drawer). The payee took the cheques in good faith in discharge of
a debt owed to her by the agent. The court found that the agent
"was authorized to sign cheques on behalf of [his principal]" and
that the payee "took the cheques as a holder without notice of
any restriction on [the agent's] authority". The court thus
concluded that36 payee "took the cheques in the role of a holder in
due course". 1
Arguably the case was wrongly decided. Payee was a bona fide
party, but it is far from certain that she was a bona fide purchaser.
In order to determine that, we need to know more about the
circumstances under which payee took the corporate cheques in
satisfaction of the agent's debt. The decision fails altogether to
provide this information, as well as to discuss existing obstacles to
the view that a payee may be a holder in due course.
At this juncture it seems inconceivable that the question of
whether a payee may be a holder in due course can be conclusively settled without legislation. It is worthwhile to examine the
solution adopted by the UCC, where s. 3-302(2) flatly states that
"[a] payee may be a holder in due course". The Official
Comment (point 2) accompanying the provision deserves careful
reading:
2. Subsection (2) is intended to settle the long continued conflict over the
status of the payee as a holder in due course. This conflict has turned very
131

Section 60(2).

3-111:
An instrument is payable to bearer when by its terms it is payable to ...
(b) a specified person or bearer...
133 Chalmers, supra, footnote 15 at p. 28.
134 The case of House Property Co. of London, Lim., and Baylis & Durlacher v. London
132 UCC

County and Westminster Bank (1915), 84 L.J. K.B. 1846, was concerned with a cheque
payable to C "and others or Bearer" and marked "account payee". The court held that
the bank was negligent in paying the cheque to the bearer's account rather than to the
named payee's without making any inquiry.
135
(1977), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 585, [1977] 5 W.W.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.).
136
Ibid., at p. 587 D.L.R., p. 3 W.W.R.
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largely upon the word "negotiated" in the original Section 52(4),137 which is
now eliminated. The position here taken is that the payee may become a
holder in due course to the same extent and under the same circumstances
as any other holder. This is true whether he takes the instrument by
purchase from a third person or directly from the obligor. All that is
necessary is that the payee meet the requirements of this section. In the
following cases, among others, the payee is a holder in due course:
a. A remitter, purchasing goods from P, obtains a bank draft payable to P
and forwards it to P, who takes it for value, in good faith and without notice
as required by this section.
b. The remitter buys the bank draft payable to P, but it is forwarded by
the bank directly to P, who takes it in good faith and without notice in
payment of the remitter's obligation to him.
c. A and B sign a note as co-makers. A induces B to sign by fraud, and
without authority from B delivers the note to P, who takes it for value, in
good faith and without notice.
d. A defrauds the maker into signing an instrument payable to P. P pays
A for it in good faith and without notice, and the maker delivers the
instrument directly to P.
e. D draws a check payable to P and gives it to his agent to be delivered to
P in payment of D's debt. The agent delivers it to P, who takes it in good
faith and without notice in payment of the agent's
debt to P. But as to this
138
case see Section 3-304(2), which may apply.
f. D draws a check payable to P but blank as to the amount, and gives it
to his agent to be delivered to P. The agent fills in the check with an
excessive amount, and P takes it for value, in good faith and without notice.
g. D draws a check blank as to the name of the payee, and gives it to his
agent to be filled in with the name of A and delivered to A. The agent fills
in the name of P, and P takes the check in good faith, for value and without
notice.

It is obvious that only in the first two examples can the payee

safely be regarded as a purchaser of the instrument. Example (c)
is Lewis v. Clay. 139 Examples (d) and (e) are in fact variations of
Jones v. Waring.140 Likewise, examples (f) and (g) are variations
on Herdman v. Wheeler, 141 unless of course P and D in example
"[O]riginal Section 52(4)" of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (the
predecessor of Article 3 of the Code) corresponded to s. 56(1 )(b) of the Canadian Act.
The effect of both is that to become a holder in due course one must take the
instrument by negotiation.
138 UCC 3-304(2) provides as follows:
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when he has
knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security
for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of
duty.
139 (1897), 67 L.J.Q.B. 224, 77 L.T. 653.
140 [1926] A.C. 670.
141 [1902] 1 K.B. 361.
137
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(g) had no dealings between themselves so that P could be truly
regarded as a purchaser. All three cases held that the payee was
not a holder in due course. Like these examples, they were
concerned with a payee who was a bona fide party but not a bona
fide purchaser. This does not mean, however, that the examples
are wrong. Rather, they reflect a shift in or transformation of the
holder in due course concept as actually acknowledged by the
Official Comment cited above:
The position here [in 3-302(2)] taken is that the payee may become a holder
in due course to the same extent and under the same circumstances as any
other holder. This is true whether he takes the instrument by purchase from
a third person or directly from the obligor. All that is necessary is that the
payee meet the requirements of this section.

Does this mean that any bona fide payee taking the instrument
for value, thereby meeting "the requirements of this section",142
may be a holder in due course? Suppose a payee on a promissory
note is a seller of goods. His action on the note against the maker,
the buyer of the goods, is defended by an alleged breach of
condition or warranty relating to the sold goods. Where the
breach was made unknowingly, may the payee-seller meet the
defence by claiming a holder in due course status on the basis of
his lack of knowledge of his own breach?
One court thought that under UCC 3-302(2) the answer is yes:
"No one has suggested that being a party to the underlying transaction bars the holder from being one in due course". 143 One
answer to such a far-fetched view is that under UCC 3-305(2) the
freedom of a holder in due course extends only to "defenses of
any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt".
Stated otherwise, even if the seller in the previous example were
a holder in due course, he would take the instrument subject to
the buyer's defences, since he has dealt with him. 144 The better
view seems to be that such a seller is not a holder in due course at
all. While UCC 3-302(2) and its accompanying examples appear
to omit the purchase requirement, the payee in all the examples
142

To become a holder in due course, a holder must take the instrument "for value ... and
in good faith; and ... without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person": UCC 3-302(1). See in general
section (i), supra.
143 Saale v. Interstate Steel Co., 275 N.Y.S. 2d 532, 535 (App. Div. 1966) affd 281 N.Y.S.
2d 340 (1967).
144 For this argument, see Note, "The Concept of Holder in Due Course in Article III of
the Uniform Commercial Code", 68 Col. L. Rev. 1573 (1968), at p. 1580.
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((a) to (g)) is still a remote party to the actual dealing giving rise
to the drawer's or maker's defences. It is therefore plausible to
construe UCC 3-302(2) as embodying a remoteness element.
In the final analysis, I would not support the extension of the
holder in due course concept to situations which go beyond those
in which the holder is a purchaser of the instrument, as was
apparently done by the drafters in UCC 3-302(2). Such an
extension is inconsistent with the doctrinal and historical basis of
the holder in due course concept, and is bound to produce
confusion and further unwarranted extension, as was demonstrated above. This however does not mean that the payee in
examples (c) to (g) of the Official Comment, as well as in Jones v.
Waring,145 Lewis v. Clay, 146 or Herdman v. Wheeler, 147 should
necessarily be defeated. All these are situations in which, under
general principles of law, the drawer or maker could have been
estopped from raising his defences as against a bonafide payee.148
In all of them the one to be charged with liability was negligent,
or at least dealt directly with the swindler. It is the relative negligence or fault, as between payee and the party to be charged with
liability, which should determine the ultimate liability. The
holder in due course doctrine is entirely irrelevant in deciding this
question.
Likewise, an acceptor of a bill should be held absolutely liable
to a bona fide payee who changed his position on the basis of the
acceptance. In this framework it is unnecessary to invoke the
holder in due course doctrine as the freedom of the payee from
the acceptor's defences against the drawer has nothing to do with
the free circulation of commercial paper. The acceptor's liability
is rather based on the payee's actual change of position.
In sum, I would support a legislative solution providing that a
payee may be a holder in due course, though such a solution
should be drafted more narrowly than was UCC 3-302(2). It
should be confined in its application to a payee who is a purchaser
of the instrument, so as not to create the opportunity for an
uncontrollable extension of the concept as was inadvertently
done by the UCC drafters.
145 Supra, footnote 140.
146Supra, footnote 139.
147Supra, footnote 141.
148
The doctrine of estoppel was invoked in favour of a payee in Lloyd's Bank, Ltd. v.
Cooke, [19071 1 K.B. 794 (C.A.).
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The Drawee Bank's Right to Recover on Cheques Paid by
Mistake of Fact

(i)

Introduction
A cheque constitutes an unconditional order in writing
addressed by a customer to his bank, signed by the customer,
requiring the bank to pay on demand a certain sum in money to
the order of a specified person or to bearer. 149 Where there are
sufficient funds in the customer's account to meet the cheque, or
the bank has agreed to provide the customer with overdraft facilities, the bank is under a duty to comply with the customer's order
embodied in the cheque and to pay it on presentment. 150 This
duty is owed by the drawee bank to the customer alone and not to
the holder of the cheque. 151 Having paid the cheque in discharge
of this duty, the drawee bank may lawfully debit the drawer-customer's account with the amount of the cheque. Such payment is
also effective to discharge the obligation of the customer to the
payee on the cheque, "because the
bank has paid the cheque with
52
the authority of the customer". 1
An effective order from the customer is thus the basis of both
the bank's duty to honour the cheque and its right to charge the
customer's account. Where a bank erroneously honours a cheque
which does not contain such an effective order, it is not entitled to
charge the customer's account. Is the bank entitled to recover the
sum so paid from the recipient of the money (hereafter "the
53
recipient"1 )?
The payor bank's error as to the existence of an effective order
may take various forms. First, the cheque presented for payment
could bear a forged drawer's signature. Believing that the
instrument contains an order by its customer, the payor bank may
honour it. Second, a cheque payable to order may bear a forged
endorser's signature. While such an instrument contains an order
149 See ss. 17(1) and 165(1).
150 Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W. J. Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd., [1980] 2 W.L.R. 218
(Q.B.D.), at pp. 235-6per GoffJ. (hereafter "Simms").
151This follows from ss. 127 and 131.
152Simms, supra, footnote 150 at p. 236.
153In restitution law, such a recipient is frequently called "payee". Under the Act, the
term "payee" designates the first holder of an instrument payable to order, cf. s. 21(4).
To avoid confusion, I therefore prefer to designate the recipient of the money "recipient" rather than "payee".
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made by the customer of the bank, the order requires the bank to
pay either to the payee or to someone deriving his title to the
instrument from the payee. A forged endorsement breaks the
chain of title to the cheque. 154 Payment to one who derives his
title from the forger does not conform to the drawer's order.
Third, the bank could mistakenly ignore notice either of its
customer's death or of countermand. 155 Finally, a bank could err
in paying a cheque notwithstanding the absence of sufficient
funds in the customer's account or of an applicable agreement as
to overdraft facilities.
Among all of these possibilities, the bank's remedy is provided
for by the Act only in connection with the second situation.
Under s. 50(1), where a cheque bearing a forged endorsement is
paid "in good faith and in the ordinary course of business", the
payor bank "has the right to recover the amount so paid from the
party to whom it was so paid or from any endorser who has
56
endorsed the bill subsequently to the forged ... endorsement".1
Recovery rights of the drawee bank in other circumstances are
governed by general principles of law applicable to recovery of
money paid under a mistake of fact. The "formidable line of
authority" dealing with this general issue has been recently
summarized by Goff J. in Barclays Bank v. W.J. Simms Son &
Cooke (Southern) Ltd. 157 as follows:
From this formidable line of authority certain simple principles can, in
my judgment, be deduced: (1) If a person pays money to another under a
mistake of fact which causes him to make the payment, he is prima facie
entitled to recover it as money paid under a mistake of fact. (2) His claim
may however fail if (a) the payer intends that the [recipient] shall have the
money at all events, whether the fact be true or false, or is deemed in law so
to intend; or (b) the payment is made for good consideration, in particular
if the money is paid to discharge, and does discharge, a debt owed to the
[recipient] (or a principal on whose behalf he is authorised to receive the
payment) by the payer or by a third party by whom he is authorised to
discharge the debt; or (c) the [recipient] 15
has
changed his position in good
8
faith, or is deemed in law to have done so.

Simms itself was concerned with a situation where the payor
154 Cf. ss. 60(3) (negotiation of a bill payable to order by the holder's endorsement) and
49(1) (a forged signature is inoperative).
155 Under s. 167 such events put an end to "[tihe duty and authority of a bank to pay a
cheque drawn on it by its customer".
156 This rule is further discussed in Part Ill(i).
157 Supra, footnote 150. Prior law is discussed in Luntz, "The Bank's Right to Recover on
Cheques Paid by Mistake", 6 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 308 (1968).
158 Simms, supra, footnote 150 at p. 232.
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bank erroneously overlooked an effective countermand and paid
the cheque. Applying his summary to these particular facts, Goff
J. concluded that the payor bank was entitled to recover the

amount of the cheque from the recipient. The crucial question
was whether the payment was with or without a mandate.
Payment over an effective countermand is without a mandate. 159
As such it does not discharge the drawer's debt owed to the
recipient so as to fall into exception (2)(b) of Mr. Justice Goffs

summary. 160 In another situation however:

...
where the bank pays in the mistaken belief that there are sufficient funds
or overdraft facilities to meet the cheque ... the effect of the bank's
payment is to accept the customer's request for overdraft facilities; the
payment is therefore within the bank's mandate, with the result that not
only is the bank entitled to have recourse to its customer, but the
customer's obligation to the [recipient] is discharged. It follows that the
[recipient] has given consideration for the payment; with the consequence
that, although the payment has been caused by the bank's mistake, the
money is irrecoverable from
the [recipient] unless the transaction of
161
payment is itself set aside.

I will first critically examine the holding in Simms with respect
to the problem of payment over an effective countermand. Next,
I will discuss the application of Simms to the case where a drawee

bank erroneously pays a cheque bearing a forged drawer's signature. In each situation I will outline alternative solutions and

make my own suggestions for statutory reform.
(ii)

Payment over customer's countermand

In connection with payment over an effective countermand,
the doctrinal basis of Simms is not free from doubts. Particularly

troublesome is Mr. Justice Goff's reasoning that since payment
by the payor bank was made without the customer's authority, it

did not discharge the customer's debt owed to the recipient. 162

This overlooks the position in equity "under which a person who
159 Except that it can be regarded as payment under apparent authority: Goode, "The
Bank's Right to Recover Money Paid on a Stopped Payment", 97 L.O.R. 254 (1981),
at p. 258.
160 Previous case law on recovery of payment made over a customer's countermand is
reviewed in Sanda Rodgers Magnet, "Inaccurate or Ambiguous Countermand and
Payment Over Countermand", 4 C.B.L.J. 297 (1979-80), at p. 3 11 . The case law is also
reviewed by Reynolds, "Countermand and Cheques", 15 U. of B.C. L. Rev. 341
(1981), at p. 359.
161 Simms, supra, footnote 150 at p. 236.
162 Text following footnote 158, supra.
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pays the debt of another without authority may be allowed the
advantage of the payment". 163 Such "equitable doctrines" were
164
explicitly relied upon in Shapera v. Toronto-Dominion Bank.
The court in that case dismissed an action of a customer against a
drawee bank which erroneously had paid on a countermanded
cheque, inter alia, because "payment discharged a legal liability
of the customer [to the recipient]". 165 The latter case thus appears
to mean that whenever the customer has no defences against the
recipient or is sued by a holder in due course who overcomes the
customer's defences, 166 payment by the payor bank discharges the
customer's liability under principles of equity. While Shapera
dealt with the position of the payor bank vis-A-vis its customer,
the inevitable implication is that a valid discharge of the
customer's debt owed to the recipient is a bar to the payor bank's
recovery from the recipient. Stated otherwise, it is only where the
customer could effectively assert defences against the recipient
that the payor bank may not charge the customer's account and
may recover from the recipient. This is markedly different from
Simms under which the payor bank is never permitted to charge
the customer's account and may always recover from the
recipient irrespective of the latter's entitlement from the
customer.
The UCC adopts in s. 4-407 a solution which corresponds with
the one suggested in Shapera. The provision reads as follows:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the
drawer ...or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by
the drawer . . . to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent

necessary to prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment ...the payor
bank shall be subrogated to the rights
(a) of any holder in due course ...against the drawer ...and
(b)

(c)

of the payee or any other holder ... against the drawer ...

either

on the [cheque] or under the transaction out of which the [cheque]
arose; and
of the drawer... against the payee or any other holder ... with
respect to the transaction out of which the [cheque] arose.

163 Shapera v. Toronto-Dominion Bank (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 122 at p. 127, [1971] 1
W.W.R. 442 at p. 448 (Man. Q.B.).
164Ibid.
165Ibid.

166BEA, s. 74(b): "a holder in due course ...holds the bill free from any defect of title of
prior parties, as well as from mere personal defences available to prior parties among
themselves."

11-6 C.B.L.J.
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Under this provision, it is the entitlement of the recipient as
against the drawer which determines the payor bank's rights.
Thus, where payment is made either to a holder in due course or
to a payee entitled to enforce payment as against the drawer, the
drawee bank may debit the drawer's account (subsecs. (a) and
(b)). In such a case the bank is barred from recovering from the
recipient. Where the drawer has valid defences, effective as
against the recipient, the drawee bank may recover from the
latter under subsec. (c). Indeed, by using the term "subrogated",
UCC 4-407 explicitly adopts the "equitable doctrines" which
underly the holding in Shapera.167
From a policy perspective, Shapera seems to represent a better
view than Simms. 168 In the latter case, Goff J. was "happy to be
able to reach the conclusion that the money is recoverable by the
plaintiff bank", because the dispute between the customer and
the recipient would be better determined in an action as between
themselves. 169 Unfortunately he failed to consider the goal of
endowing payment of a cheque with finality, thereby assimilating
the use of cheques to that of money. Nor did he seem to appreciate that where the recipient is a holder in due course the
customer's defences against the payee cannot be raised, so that in
any event the dispute between the immediate parties to the transaction underlying the cheque will not be an issue in the action
against the recipient.
However, in the final analysis I would not suggest the adoption
of the Shapera/UCC solution either. Its effect is to protect the
payor bank from the consequences of its failure to follow the
customer's effective stop-payment order. The payor bank may
debit the countermanding customer's account and take its
chances as to the lack of defences on the part of its customer as
against the holder's action. When the cheque is collected through
a depositary bank, the latter's holder in due course status under s.
165(3)170 effectively eliminates any risk involved in such a course
of action. Having debited the countermanding customer's
167 For the use of subrogation in a similar context, see B. Liggett (Liverpool), Ltd. v.
Barclays Bank, Ltd., [1928] 1 K.B. 48 at p. 64, directly relied upon in Shapera, supra,
footnote 163 at pp. 127-8 D.L.R., p. 448 W.W.R.
168 The subrogation solution is also supported by Goode, supra, footnote 159 at p. 263.
169 Simms, supra, footnote 150 at pp. 239-40.
170 For the depositary bank's holder in due course status under s. 165(3), see the discussion
at the end of Part l(i), supra.
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account, the payor bank can always defend the customer's action
by being subrogated to the depositary bank's rights under s.
165(3).
A sound legislative solution should eliminate the subrogation
of the payor bank to the depositary bank's position. It should also
impose the credit strain on the payor bank until final entitlement
to the funds is determined as between the drawer and the holder.
By leaving the funds with the recipient, such a solution is
consistent with the goal of assimilating the use of cheques to that
of money. By not depriving the drawer of the use of these funds,
the solution is also consistent with the effectiveness of his stoppayment order. The proposed solution puts the credit strain on
the payor bank, the party whose fault infringed upon the drawer's
right. Against Mr. Justice Goff's wishes,17 1 the payor bank will
find itself involved in the customer-recipient's dispute, but its
involvement is the result of its own error.
Along these lines, my proposed legislative solution to the
mistaken payment over an effective countermand issue is the
following:
1. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, a payor bank
which has paid a cheque over an effective stop-payment order
of the drawer may not debit the drawer's account with the
amount of the cheque.
2. To prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent
necessary to prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment
of the cheque, a payor bank which has paid a cheque in good
faith over an effective stop-payment order of the drawer shall
be subrogated to the rights
(a) of the payee, or any other holder of the cheque except
for a collecting agent, against the drawer, either on
the cheque or on the basic transaction, as if the
cheque had not been paid; and
(b) of the drawer against the payee or any other holder of
the cheque with respect to the basic transaction.
3. (a) The rights of the payor bank under subsec. (2) may be
enforced by bringing an action against all defendants so
that all will be bound by the outcome of the litigation.
(b) Final judgment against the drawer in an action on the
basis of rights under subsec. 2(a) entitles the payor bank
171See

text and footnote 169, supra.
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to debit the drawer's account with the amount of the
judgment. Final judgment against any defendant in an
action brought on the basis of rights under subsec. 2(b),
operates as a final judgment in favour of the drawer as to
lack of authority on the part of the payor bank to debit his
account with the amount of the drawer's claim under
subsec. 2(b).
A payor bank which has paid the holder a cheque over an
effective stop-payment order of the drawer has no rights but
those enumerated in this section.

(iii) Payment of a forged cheque
I will now consider the application of Simms to the case in
which a drawee bank erroneously pays a cheque bearing a forged
drawer's signature. For more than 200 years it has been thought
that a drawee pays at his peril and that he cannot recover from a
bona fide recipient. This is the doctrine of Price v. Neal,172 or the
principle of finality of payment. According to Dean Ames:
The rule established by Price v. Neal, that a drawee pays (or accepts) at
his peril a bill, on which the drawer's signature is forged, has been
repeatedly recognized ... Unfortunately, there is not a similar unanimity as
to the reason of the rule. The drawee's inability to recover the money paid
is often referred to his supposed negligence. He ought ... to know the
signature of the drawer ... Another so-called explanation of the rule ... [is]
that the drawee is "conclusively presumed to know" or is "estopped to
deny", the signature of the drawer ... The holder's right to retain the
money paid him by the drawee has sometimes [also] been placed upon the
ground, that, in consequence of the payment, he has lost the right to
recourse against prior indorsers, which he would have had, in case the bill
had been dishonored ... The true principle [is however that] ... as between
two persons having equal equities, one of whom must suffer the legal title
shall prevail. The holder of the bill of exchange paid away his money when
he bought it; the drawee parted with his money when he took up the bill.
Each paid in the belief that the bill was genuine. In point of natural justice
they are equally meritorious. But the holder has the legal title to the
money. A court of equity ... cannot properly interfere to compel the holder
73
to surrender his legal advantage. 1

Notwithstanding Ames, the explanation which was ultimately
given by English courts was based upon the loss of recourse rights
against prior endorsers. As explained below, this represents a
serious curtailment of the scope of the rule, for it means that
172 (1762), 3 Burr. 1354, 97 E.R. 871.
173 Ames, "The Doctrine of Price v. Neal", 4 Har. L. Rev. (1891), at pp. 297-9.
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whenever no loss of recourse rights is involved, as where the
recipient is the payee on the cheque, the principle of finality of
payment does not apply and the payor bank may recover from the
recipient.
The leading case is National Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Barclays
Bank International Ltd. 7 4 Here, a blank cheque stolen from a
customer of the drawee bank was made payable to one Ismail,
and bearing a forged drawer's signature, was delivered to him for
good consideration to be given after payment of the cheque.
Ismail deposited the cheque in his bank account with another
bank and parted with the consideration only after the drawee
bank had paid the cheque. It was held that the drawee bank could
recover from Ismail. The court rejected the existence of an
absolute duty on the part of a payor bank to know the signature
of its customer. It further rejected the existence of a duty of care
owed by a payor bank to the holder in honouring cheques. The
court thus held that a payor bank could recover from a recipient
who had not lost a recourse right by virtue of the payor bank's
original payment. The court explained and distinguished Price v.
Neal by saying that the recipient there was a subsequent endorsee
rather than the original payee on the instrument. The fact that the
recipient in National Westminster had parted with valuable
consideration on the basis of the bank's payment was considered
by the court to be immaterial. Payment by a payor bank of an
undetectable forged cheque is no representation that the drawer's
signature is genuine. It is merely a representation as to the availability of funds in the customer's account. In the absence of negligence, no estoppel by representation could arise on the bank
clearing such a cheque whether presented for special collection or
cleared in the normal way. Since an endorser is entitled to
immediate notice of dishonour (ss. 96 et seq.) and is released if he
is not given it (s. 96(1)), the holder is entitled to know immediately whether the bill is honoured or dishonoured so that he can
give his notice. If the holder is allowed by the drawee to suppose
that the bill has been honoured and is deprived of the opportunity
to give notice, he is prejudiced by the loss of recourse. Payment
by the drawee is final then only when made to a recipient who is
under a duty to give notice of dishonour. Where no loss of
recourse (by virtue of failure to give a timely notice of dishonour)
174

[1975] Q.B. 654, per Kerr J. (hereafter "National Westminster").

310

Canadian Business Law Journal

[Vol. 6

is involved, the payor bank is free to go ahead and recover from
the recipient. The only recipient without a recourse right (and
hence without a duty to give notice of dishonour) is, ultimately,
the payee.
This analysis was fully adopted by Goff J. in Simms.' 75 Indeed,
it fits his general summary, 76
the loss of recourse being the change
of position within rule 2(c). 1
Consider the position of a depositary bank which collects for a
payee a cheque bearing a forged drawer's signature. On discovering the forgery, may the payor bank recover from the depositary bank? According to National Westminster, the answer
depends on whether or not the depositary bank has parted with
money to the payee in reliance on the cheque being honoured.
Where the payee has actually collected the proceeds, the depositary bank can successfully raise a defence to the payor bank's
action "on the basis that as the collecting bank they were in the
same position as agents who have parted with the money to their
177
principal, so that it is then no longer recoverable from them".
Otherwise, i.e., where the payee has not collected the proceeds of
the forged cheque, the payor bank has a good cause of action
against the depositary bank. In National Westminster, the amount
of the forged cheque remained in the payee's account. The case
thus fell within the latter category and judgment was given
against the depositary bank as well.
Where a payor bank recovers from the depositary bank which
has not parted with the proceeds of the forged cheque, may the
latter debit the payee's account? While the court in National
Westminster did not discuss this question, it implicitly assumed
that the depositary bank has such a right. I agree. The right is not
based on the payee's contract as an endorser. 178 Presumably it
emerges from restitution law. Not suing its depositor-customer on
the endorser's contract, the depositary bank is not strictly obliged
to give a statutory notice of dishonour, 179 and therefore does not
lose its recourse rights on the late discovery of the forgery.
The treatment of the depositary bank's position in National
175 Simms, [198012W.L.R. 218 (Q.B.D.), at p.237.
176Footnote 158 and text, supra.
177NationalWestminster, supra, footnote 174 at p. 677.
178 Cf. Bank of Nova Scotia v. Sharp (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 260 at pp. 266-7, [1975] 6
W.W.R. 97 at p. 103 (B.C.C.A.).
179 Ibid.
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Westminster seems to me to be satisfactory. At the same time I
have serious difficulties with the principal holding of the case in
relation to a mistaken payment of a cheque bearing a forged
drawer's signature. To begin with, as indicated by Ames,180 there
is nothing in Price v. Neal 8 ' which compels the doctrinal analysis
given in National Westminster18 and adopted in Simms. 183 In fact,
a change of position requirement as the basis for the recipient's
defence against the payor bank is incongruous in light of s.
129(a). Under the latter provision an acceptor of a bill "is
precluded from denying to a holder in due course . . . the
genuineness of [the drawer's] signature". No change of position is
thus required when a holder in due course purports to enforce
payment against an acceptor of a forged cheque. It would
therefore be anomalous to subject a holder in due course to a
change of position requirement where he defends against an
action by a payor bank to recover payment made on a forged
cheque. But even if finality of payment applies only as against a
recipient who has changed his position in good faith, as suggested
by rule 2(c) of the general principles applicable to recovery of
money paid under mistake of fact,'84 National Westminster is
indefensible. First, it is hard to see why the endorsee's loss of
recourse rights against prior parties should be singled out as the
only change of position effective as a defence against the payor
bank. In National Westminster, the recipient was the payee of the
cheque who parted with consideration on the actual payment of
86
the cheque; 8 5 this should be a sufficient change of position.
Secondly, an endorsee who is paid on a forged cheque does not
necessarily lose his recourse rights against prior parties on the
subsequent dishonour of the cheque. True, on the dishonour of a
bill, notice of dishonour must be given to prior parties "not later
than the juridical or business day next following the dishonour of
the bill". 18 7 Without such notice, recourse against prior parties is
lost. Yet, under s. 105(1) "[d]elay ...is excused where ...caused
180 Footnote 173 and text, supra.
181 Supra, footnote 172.
182 Footnotes 174, 175 and text, supra.
183 Footnote 175, supra.
184 Footnote 158 and text, supra.
185 Text which follows footnote 174, supra.
186 But cf. the court's reasoning as explained ibid.
187 BEA, ss. 96(1) and 97(a).
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by circumstances beyond the control of the party giving notice".
It seems conceivable that delay in giving the notice caused by the
payor bank's original payment of the cheque falls into this
category. It should not cause the endorsee to lose his recourse
1 88
rights.
In sum, National Westminster is far from persuasive. First,
explaining Price v. Neal on the basis of the recipient's change of
position is not convincing. Secondly, it is unclear why loss of
recourse rights is the only acceptable change of position. Thirdly,
it is doubtful whether any loss of recourse rights is actually
involved.
Last but not least, limiting finality of payment only to the case
of a change of position is not acceptable as a matter of policy. In
support of the principle of finality of payment it is frequently said
that "[t]he rule in Price v. Neal places the risk of forgery of the
drawing on the drawee bank, which is the proper party to bear
that risk, it being an integral part of its function and risk against
which it can insure itself, thereby distributing the burden among
the clients making use of its services."'1 89 In this framework, the
change of position limitation appears to be unwarranted.
It is worthwhile at this juncture to examine the legislative
solution adopted by the American UCC with respect to the
drawee bank's right to recover from the recipient the amount of a
cheque bearing a forged drawer's signature paid by mistake of
fact. Under UCC 3-418, "payment ... is final in favor of a holder
in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his
position in reliance on the payment." By its own terms, 19° the
provision does not apply to payment of a cheque bearing a forged
endorsement, a situation for which other provisions1 9' provide a
188 In connection with these points of criticism, I share the view of Professor Scott, p. 129
of his (unpublished) Law of Banking and Negotiable Instruments Course Notes and
Syllabus (1977).
189 Barak, supra, footnote 25 at p. 46.
190 UCC 3-418 reads in full:
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article on Bank
Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and except for liability for breach of warranty
on presentment under the preceding section, payment or acceptance of any
instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has in good
faith changed his position in reliance on the payment.
For the relation between this provision and Article 4, see Colombo, "Commercial
Paper and Forgery: Broader Liability for Banks?" (1981] U. I11. L. F. 813. For "the
preceding section" see footnotes 191 and 192 and text, infra.
191 UCC 3-417(1) and 4-207(1).

1981-82]

Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act

313

solution similar to the one adopted by s. 50(1) of the Canadian
Act. 192 According to Official Comment, UCC 3-418 "follows the
rule of Price v. Neal ... under which a drawee who ... pays an

instrument on which the signature of the drawer is forged ...
cannot recover back his payment." It is, however, apparent from
the language of the provision that except for when he is a holder
in due course, a change of position is an essential element of the
recipient's defence. At the same time, the provision does not go
so far as to limit finality of payment to the case of a subsequent
endorsee whose alleged change of position is the loss of recourse
rights against prior parties. Furthermore, under UCC 3-302(2),
"[a] payee may be a holder in due course", provided of course, he
took the instrument in good faith and for value as generally
required under UCC 3-302(1). In other words, there is no
question that payee Ismail in National Westminster would have
been protected under UCC 3-418.193 He definitely changed his
position on the basis of payment. 194 1Arguably,
he could also claim
95
the status of a holder in due course.
I would favour a legislative solution providing for the finality of
payment on a cheque bearing a forged drawer's signature.
Finality of payment should benefit every bona fide recipient, not
just a holder in due course. I would thus support the adoption of a
provision modelled on UCC 3-418 without the change of position
requirement presently imposed on one not a holder in due
course. Such a solution endows payment of a cheque with finality
and allocates the loss to the payor bank which is the best riskbearer among the parties involved.
III.

Allocation of Forgery Losses

A sound scheme allocating forgery losses should be aimed at
achieving loss reduction and loss distribution while not undermining the fundamental policies underlying the use of negotiable

instruments as payment devices. These fundamental policies are
the free circulation of commercial paper and the finality of
192See text subsequent to footnote 155, supra.
193See text which follows footnote 174, supra.
194See footnotes 185 and 186 and text, supra.
195But cf. First National City Bank v. Altman, 3 UCC Rep. 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), affd
27 App. Div. 2d 706. In that case, the court did not consider the possibility that a payee
in Ismail's position could be a holder in due course.

314

Canadian Business Law Journal

[Vol. 6

payment. It has, however, been observed that "[t]he allocation of
losses resulting from check forgeries stems from a complex and
interrelated body of statutory and case law" and that "the law
allocates losses ... according to a set of mechanical doctrines". 196
Allocation to an innocent party depends first upon which
signature has been forged. Secondly, allocation is determined by
estoppel principles. 197 In general, a forged signature does not
charge the person whose signature has been forged with liability
on the cheque. This emerges from s. 49(1) which provides that a
"forged ... signature is wholly inoperative", as well as from s. 131
under which "[n]o person is liable ... [on the bill] who has not
signed it".
In dealing with the responsiveness of the scheme to policy
considerations, I will first deal with the allocation of losses as
determined by the type of signature forged. Then I will consider
the allocation of losses as affected by some aspects of estoppel
principles, or preclusions from setting up forgery. Finally, I will
examine the possibility of circumventing the estoppel exception
and the responsiveness of this pursuit to policy considerations.
(i)

The basic scheme
According to the above-mentioned ss. 49(1) and 131, a
customer of a drawee bank whose drawer's signature has been
forged is not liable on the cheque. Nor is he liable to the drawee
bank where it has erroneously paid the cheque. Where the
forgery of the drawer's signature is detected before payment,
these provisions allocate the loss to the payee who has taken the
cheque from the forger. Where forgery is detected after payment,
the payor bank may bear the loss under the doctrine of Price v.
Neal, discussed in Part II of this paper.
A forged endorser's signature constitutes a breach in the chain
of title to the cheque: "no right to retain the bill or to give a
discharge therefor or to enforce payment thereof against any
party thereto can be acquired through or under [a forged] signature" (s. 49(1)). A forged endorsement does not pass title or
lawful possession to the transferee. Title and right to possession
196 Comment, "Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable
Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code", 62 Yale L.J. 417 (1953), at p. 419.
197 For a recent discussion on forged cheques see N. Rafferty, "Forged Cheques: A
Consideration of the Rights and Obligations of Banks and Their Customers", 4
C.B.L.J. 208 (1979-80). See also J.S. Ziegel and B. Geva, supra, footnote 77 at p. 819.
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remain with the original holder whose signature has been forged.
A transferee who derives his title, directly or indirectly, through a
forged endorsement is not a "holder" in relation to parties whose
signatures on the bill preceded the forgery because one cannot be
"holder" without "negotiation" (s. 60(1)). Since negotiation of
an order instrument is by "the endorsement of the holder" (s.
60(3)), the forger, and hence anyone deriving title from him, is
not a "holder." Since a holder in due course must be a holder (s.
56(1)),198 so one who takes a cheque subsequent to a forged
endorsement cannot be a "holder in due course" in relation to
parties whose signatures preceded the forgery. 199
The "true owner", namely the one from whom the cheque has
been stolen and whose endorsement has been forged, may sue in
conversion or in money had and received, any person through
whose hands the cheque has passed subsequent to the forgery.
The defendant need not necessarily be the one in possession at
the time of the action. By virtue of s. 133, a defendant who is not
the payor bank may sue any prior transferee who took the
instrument subsequent to the forgery: an endorser of a bill is
precluded from denying "the genuineness and regularity ... of ...
all previous endorsements" (s. 133(b)), as well as that "at the
time of his endorsement ... he had ... a good title" (s. 133(c)).
These preclusions effectively run in favour of all transferees
subsequent to the taker from the forger. 2°° On their strength,
"the person in possession of a bill bearing a forged indorsement is
considered a holder against every party who signed the bill after
the forgery of the indorsement". 20 1 The one who ultimately bears
the loss is the party who took the cheque directly from the forger:
he is liable on his signature to subsequent parties and is liable in
in general, Part I, supra.
199But see Groves-Raffin Construction Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1975), 64 D.L.R.
(3d) 78, [1976] 2 W.W.R. 673 (B.C.C.A.), as to the possible effect of s. 165(3) on this
proposition. The case is convincingly criticized by the Law Reform Commission of
Canada in The Cheque: Some Modernization, Report 11 (1979), p. 15.
200 The s. 133(b) preclusion runs in favour of a "holder in due course". The s. 133(c)
preclusion runs in favour of an "immediate or a subsequent endorsee". In relation to
prior parties who signed the instrument subsequent to a forged endorsement, the
possessor of the bill is an "immediate or ...
subsequent endorsee" as well as
(depending on his compliance with the good faith purchase requirement of s. 56(1)) a
"holder in due course". The s. 133(b) preclusion (running only in favour of a holder in
due course) includes also the genuineness and regularity of the drawer's signature.
201 Barak, "The Uniform Code Commercial Paper: An Outsider's View, Part II", 3
Israel L. Rev. 184 (1968), at p. 186.
198 See
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conversion or for money had and received to the one from whom
the bill was stolen and whose signature has been forged. No cause
of action runs in his favour.
The preclusions under s. 133(b) and (c) do not run in favour of
the payor bank. Where a cheque bearing a forged endorsement
has erroneously been paid, and the person from whom the
cheque was stolen and whose endorsement has been forged (the
"true owner") sues the payor-drawee in conversion or in money
had and received, the latter bank's remedy is provided for by s.
50(1). Under this section, where a cheque bearing a forged
endorsement is paid "in good faith and in the ordinary course of
business", the payor bank "has the right to recover the amount so
paid from the person to whom it was so paid or from any endorser
who has endorsed the bill subsequently to the forged ... endorsement". The defendant may sue prior endorsers who took the
instrument subsequent to the forgery either on the basis of the
explicit remedy provided for by s. 50(2)202 or on the basis of the s.
133(b) and (c) preclusions. The one who ultimately bears the loss
is, again, the taker from the forger. He does not have a "prior
endorser subsequent to the forged ... endorsement" whom he
can sue under s. 50(2). Nor can he find any intermediary party
against whom he can invoke the estoppel under s. 133(b) and (c).
In fact, this scheme of allocation of forgery losses is not
arbitrary or mechanical. 2 3 The rationale behind the rule as to the
freedom from liability of the party whose signature has been
forged is obvious. The doctrine of Price v. Neal as to the finality
of payment of cheques bearing a forged drawer's signature is
basically responsive to policy considerations. What is subject to
criticism in connection with the doctrine is, rather, the recent
2°4
trend to restrict its application.
Similarly, the scheme allocating forged endorsement losses has
its own logic. The scheme goes back to Mead v. Young 2 5 where
Buller J. reasoned that the transferee in possession subsequent to
the forgery who cannot recover on the bill against parties prior to
the forgery,
202 Section 50(2) provides:
(2) Any such person or endorser from whom such amount has been recovered
[under s. 50(1)] has the like right of recovery against any prior endorser
subsequent to the forged or unauthorized endorsement.
203Notwithstanding text and footnote 196, supra.
204See in general, Part II, supra.
205(1790), 4 T.R. 28, 100 E.R. 876.
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... will be induced to prosecute the forger; and that would be the case even
if [the instrument] had passed through several hands, because each indorser
would trace it up to the person from whom he received it, and at last it
would come to him who had been guilty of the forgery: whereas if the
[possessor] succeed in this action, he will have no inducement to prosecute
for the forgery ... 206

By allocating the loss to the taker from the forger, the scheme
encourages a transferee to inquire into the title of his transferor.
The policy behind the scheme is, therefore, one of loss reduction.
Opposite policy considerations were raised in Mead v. Young
by Chief Justice Kenyon. In his dissent he noted that the majority's view "will put an insuperable clog on this species of
property" and stressed the heavy "burden on persons taking bills
of exchange to require proof of an indorsee that
the person from
207
whom he received the bill was the real payee" .
It is obvious that the majority view which was subsequently
incorporated into the Canadian Act, 20 8 while having its own logic,
is inconsistent with the policies of free circulation of commercial
paper and finality of payment. 20 9 A good faith purchase of
commercial paper does not secure the right to obtain payment.
Similarly, even where payment is made, it does not shield the
recipient from a subsequent restitutionary claim by the payor.
This state of the law is specifically rejected in civil law by the
Geneva Uniform Law (ULB). According to that law, the person
who is in possession of a bill deriving his title through an uninterrupted series of endorsements may enforce the instrument also
against parties prior to the forged endorsement. The risk of a
forged endorsement falls on the person who lost the
instrument.2 10 Providing a bona fide purchaser with good title and
protecting him against a restitutionary claim by the payor, the
ULB rule is consistent with the free circulation as well as with the
finality of payment policies. However, since it does not
206

Ibid., at pp. 31-2.

207

Ibid., at p. 30.

208

The rule under the U.K. Act is not identical. Cf. text and footnotes 236-7, infra.

209

Cf. Perini Corp. v. The First National Bank of Habersham County, 553 F. 2d 398

(U.S.C.A. 5th Cir. 1977) dealing (at pp. 405-6) with the same inconsistency from an
American perspective.
210 See in general: Vis, "Forged Indorsements", 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 547 (1979), at p. 550.
The adoption of the ULB rule in Canada is recommended in Baxter, supra, footnote
120 at p. 78.
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encourage a transferee to inquire into his transferor's title, the
rule is inconsistent with the policy of loss reduction.
An interesting compromise position has been advanced by the
UNCITRAL draft. 211 The draft adopted the ULB rule but added

a cause of action in favour of the "true owner" as against the
taker from the forger.212 By protecting transferees who took the
paper subsequent to the taker from the forger, it follows the ULB
rule, thereby enhancing the free circulation and finality policies.

At the same time, the true owner's cause of action against the
taker from the forger secures the policy of loss reduction
advanced by Buller J. and adopted by the Canadian Act. I believe
that such a compromise position, or middle rule, should be

seriously considered in any reform of the BEA.
Both the Act and the UNCITRAL draft place forged
endorsement losses on the taker from the forger. Where the taker
is a bank, whether the payor or a collecting bank, this result is

consistent with the policy of loss distribution, since a bank can
absorb the loss and distribute it among its customers, with or
without the aid of insurance. Where the taker from the forger is
not a bank, the policy of loss distribution is not enhanced by this
scheme of allocating forgery losses. In such a case, loss distribution can be achieved by private insurance. Those dealing with
commercial paper should insure themselves against the risk of
taking instruments bearing forged endorsements. 213
(ii) Preclusion under s. 49(1)
The responsiveness to policy considerations of the scheme
allocating forgery losses has proved inadequate in conjunction
with the rules dealing with the preclusion from setting up forgery.
211 UNCITRAL stands for the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
On its effort to harmonize and unify the law of international trade, see e.g., Honnold,
"The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and
Methods", 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 201 (1979).
212 See in general: Vis, supra, footnote 210 at p. 553. The draft does not cover cheques.
This type of solution was suggested in the early seventies by A. Barak, The Nature of
the Negotiable Instrument (Jerusalem Academic Press), pp. 153-5 (in Hebrew).
213 To secure a broader loss distribution, insurance should also cover the risk of a forged
drawer's signature. This is so because where the forgery of the drawer's signature is
detected before payment of the cheque, the loss falls not on a bank but on the payee
who took the cheque from the forger. See the first paragraph in the present section,
supra. For an American perspective on forgery insurance and its role in the scheme
allocating forgery losses, see Farnsworth, "Insurance Against Check Forgery", 60 Col.
L. Rev. 284 (1960).
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These rules derive from s. 49(1): "where a signature on a bill is
forged ... the forged ... signature is wholly inoperative ... unless

the party against whom it is sought to retain or enforce payment
of the bill is precluded from setting up the forgery". As discussed
below, the rules governing estoppel by negligence, and their
relationship with those governing estoppel by contract, have
proved problematic.
The authority for the drawer's duty of care toward the drawee
is Young v. Grote.214 It was held in that case that a drawee bank
may debit the account of the drawer for the full amount of a
cheque that was negligently drawn so as to permit its subsequent
alteration by the insertion of words and figures without erasures.
For some time, the real meaning and even the authority of the
case were doubted. It was questioned whether the case had been
decided on the basis of the payor bank's apparent authority, the
drawer's duty of care in favour of all takers of a negotiable instrument, or the existence of a contractual duty to take care owed by
a depositor to his bank with respect to cheques. 215 In Colonial
Bank of AustralasiaLtd. v. Marshall,2 6 the Privy Council treated
Young v. Grote as no longer good law. The latter's authority was
fully re-established by the House of Lords in London Joint Stock
Bank Ltd. v. Macmillan and Arthur,2 7 where it was stated that
the "sole ground upon which Young v. Grote was decided ... was
that Young was a customer of the bank owing to the bank the
duty of drawing his cheque with reasonable care". 218 It is fundamental that estoppel
by negligence presupposes the existence of a
219
duty of care.

Unfortunately, English courts have confined the drawer's duty
of care to the customer-drawee bank relationship. The duty
cannot be invoked in favour of a subsequent holder including a
214 (1827), 4 Bing. 253, 130 E.R. 764.
215 See in general, Note, "Careless Spaces on Negotiable Instruments", 31 Harv. L. Rev.
779 (1918).

216 [1906] A.C. 559 (P.C.), For a contemporary valid criticism, see Beven, "Young v.
Grote", 23 L.Q.R. 390 (1907).
217 [19181 A.C. 777.

218 Ibid., at p. 793,per Lord Finlay L.C.
219 Swan v. The North British Australasian Co. Ltd. (1863), 2 H. & C. 175 at p. 182, 159
E.R. 73 (Ex. Chamber), per Blackburn J. See in general: Pickering, "Estoppel by
Conduct", 55 L.Q.R. 400 (1939), at pp. 411-16; Kadirgamar, "The Problem
Promissory Note: A Question of Estoppel", 22 Mod. L. Rev. 146 (1959); M. A.
Millner, Negligence in Modern Law (1967), pp. 142-8.
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collecting bank. Furthermore, the duty of care has been confined
to acts or omissions with regard to the drawing and signing of
cheques: "the negligence must be in the transaction itself, that is,
in the manner in which the cheque is drawn". 220 No duty has been
recognized in the English cases, even towards the drawee bank,
to exercise reasonable care (a) in the general course of carrying
on business, including the selection of employees, so as to detect
and prevent forgeries, or (b) in the examination of periodical
bank statements, so as to discover and report forgeries and
prevent a repetition thereof. A drawer is also not required to
conduct his business in such a way as to prevent the forgery of the
payee's endorsement by the drawer's employee before the
221
delivery of the cheque to the payee.
The application of these rules can be demonstrated in the
following examples:
(1) A cheque payable to the order of Corporation B is stolen
from it by its unfaithful employee. Taking advantage of
careless office procedures, the unfaithful employee also steals
the corporate stamp. With the aid of the stamp and by forging
the signatures of the authorized signing officers, he endorses
the cheque to his order. He deposits the cheque into his bank
account with a depositary bank, and draws funds against it.
Depositary bank presents the cheque to the drawee bank and
obtains payment. In the absence of estoppel by negligence,
the loss falls on the depositary bank: it is liable to the drawee
under s. 50(2) and lacks any cause of action.
(2) A payroll clerk, whose normal duty is to prepare wage or
salary cheques for employees of a company, perpetrates a
fraud by including among the cheques presented to the
authorized signing officers of the company, a number of
cheques payable to persons who were not owed any wages,
some being former employees, and some having names
invented by the fraudulent clerk. The fraudulent clerk
extracts these cheques, forges the endorsements and obtains
payment from the company's bank, which debits the
company's account accordingly. 222 The allocation of the loss
220 London Joint Stock Bank Ltd. v. Macmillan and Arthur, supra, footnote 217 at p. 795.
221See, e.g., Chalmers, supra, footnote 15 at p. 206.
222 These were the facts of Royal Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd.
(1976), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 26, [197712 S.C.R. 456.
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as between the company and the bank depends on the proper
construction of s. 21(5). That section provides that a bill
whose payee is "a fictitious or non-existing person ... may be
treated as payable to bearer". This means that where the
payee is "fictitious or non-existing" the loss falls on the
company since no endorsement is required to negotiate a
bearer instrument (s. 60(2)). The possessor of such a bill is a
holder (ss. 2, 60(2)) who may be a holder in due course, and
as such is not liable to the person from whom the bill was
stolen. Payment to him as a "holder" discharges the bill and
entitles the payor bank to debit the account of its customer (s.
139(2)).
Technical and arbitrary rules have developed in the case
law to determine whether a payee is a "fictitious or nonexisting person" within the meaning of s. 21(5).223 These rules
provide that a payee who is either a creature of imagination or
a dead person is "non-existing". A payee who is a real person
and whose name is inserted by the drawer by way of pretence,
with no intention that he will receive payment is "fictitious".
A payee who is a real person and is intended by the drawer to
receive payment, but whose name is inserted because of a
third person's fraud who falsely represents that the drawer is
indebted to such payee, is neither "fictitious" nor "nonexisting". The intention of the drawer or its signing officer
determines whether the payee is "fictitious", but not whether
he is "non-existing". 224 "Existence or non-existence is a
question of fact, not relevant to anybody's mind or
intention. "225
In our example, according to these rules, only cheques
payable to payees whose names were invented by the fraudulent clerk fall within s. 21(5). Such payees are "nonexisting". Cheques payable to former employees are not
payable to "fictitious" or "non-existing" persons, so the loss
with respect to them falls on the drawee bank. 226 This indeed
223 The rules go back to Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers, [1891] A.C. 107 (H.L.).
See in general; Peter E. Salvatori, "Vagliano's Case Revisited", 3 C.B.L.J. 296
(1978-79).
224 For this summary see Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at pp. 480-7. A recent case is Fok
Cheong Shing Investments Co. Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 123 D.L.R. (3d)
416, 32 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.).
225 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 3 at p. 481.
226 This indeed was the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Royal Bank of Canada
v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd., supra, footnote 222.
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is an arbitrary classification. Within the framework of a
drawer's duty of care, the company ought to be found liable
227
for the amounts of all the cheques.
(3) F is the bookkeeper of Corporation C. From time to time he
takes a blank cheque from the corporation's cheque book,
makes it payable to himself and, after forging the signatures
of the signing officers of the corporation and imprinting the
corporate stamp on the cheque, deposits it in his bank
account with Depositary Bank. Amounts so paid are later
withdrawn by F. Each cheque (bearing the drawer's forged
signature) is paid to Depositary Bank by the drawee Payor
Bank. Monthly statements, together with all cancelled
cheques, are sent by Payor Bank to Corporation C where they
are brought only to the attention of bookkeeper F. The
scheme works for years. When it is finally discovered, in the
absence of estoppel, the loss is borne by Payor Bank:
payment of a cheque bearing a forged drawer's signature does
not entitle the payor bank to debit its customer's account.
The courts have purported to avoid this result and shift the
loss to the customer (Corporation C in our example), by
giving liberal construction to a verification agreement
between a customer and a drawee bank. In Arrow Transfer
Co. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada,2 28 the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada (per Martland J.) read such an
agreement as precluding the customer from setting up the
forgery of his own signature ("estoppel by contract"). The
agreement in that case used broad language: it required the
customer to notify the bank of any debits wrongly made in the
account within a specified period after the receipt of each
periodical statement of account from the bank. Unless the
customer gave such notification, at the end of the stipulated
period the account presented by the bank became conclusive.
In his minority opinion, Laskin J. (as he then was) held that
the language of the agreement was not sufficiently unambiguous to protect the bank in the event of a forged drawer's
signature. The other justices relied on the verification
227 For more on this view, see Geva, "The Fictitious Payee and Payroll Padding: Royal
Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd.", 2 C.B.L.J. 418 (1977-78).
228 (1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 81, [1972] S.C.R. 845.
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agreement as a means of circumventing the effect of their own
refusal to recognize a customer's duty of care to examine
bank statements and to report forgeries
that should have been
229
discovered by such an examination.
I am not satisfied with this "estoppel by contract" theory for
the following three reasons:
(a) The theory is quite artificial and its foundation is unconvincing. As a general rule, a court will not shift loss from a
banker to a depositor merely on the basis of a broadly
drafted exemption clause in a standard form contract
which is not even tailored to meet the specific grievance
sought to be remedied. I agree with Laskin J. that the
"express reference [of s. 49(1)] to a forged signature
appears ... to oblige those who would contract out to
make it quite clear that forgery of a drawer's signature ...
is within the scope of the protection that a drawee bank
has obtained under its self-protecting contractual
arrangements". 230 My view is that the court read the
verification agreement so broadly only because it had
been convinced by the policies served by this reading. It is
more natural to implement these policies irrespective of
the contractual provision on the basis of estoppel by negligence.
(b) The estoppel by contract theory is less responsive to
policy considerations than is the estoppel by negligence
theory. Under the verification agreement, when the
customer finally detects the fraud and informs the bank of
its existence, he will not be responsible for amounts of
forged cheques included in the last periodical statement
with respect to which notice was timely given. This is so
even though the customer's failure to detect the previous
forgeries substantially contributed to this recent loss. By
the same token, the effect of the verification agreement is
to charge the customer with liability even with respect to
the first statement containing forged cheques. Where the
customer's negligence is only in not detecting forgeries,
the opposite result is accomplished under the estoppel by
229 As to the position of Laskin J. on the negligence question, see footnotes 238-9 and text,
infra.

230 Supra, footnote 228 at p. 96 D.L.R., p. 867 S.C.R.
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negligence theory. The customer will not be responsible
for forged cheques included in the first statement since his
negligence in failing to detect the forgery did not cause
the loss. The customer will, however, be answerable for
the cheques included in the last statement because the loss
in connection with this statement was caused by his failure
to prevent the repetition of the forgery by declining to
detect forgeries in connection with the previous statements. The customer's prompt notification after the last
statement prevents further loss, but is not an answer to a
claim based on the customer's previous failures to detect.
(c) Estoppel by contract is only a partial solution: it does not
shift the loss to the customer where his negligence causes
a forged endorsement (see examples (1) and (2), supra).
The results in all three examples do not reflect sound policies.
Holding a bank liable for losses to which a customer's negligence
has substantially contributed, while accomplishing loss distribution, does not enhance loss reduction. On the other hand,
allocation of forgery losses to a negligent party who could have
prevented the loss by exercising due care is consistent with the
loss reduction policy. Under these circumstances, loss distribution could be better achieved by private insurance.
It is possible to speculate on why the courts have declined to
charge bank customers and holders of negotiable instruments
with a duty of care in connection with the prevention or detection
of forgeries. One can assume that the refusal to impose a duty on
a bank customer to examine bank statements with reasonable
care and to report erroneous debits within a reasonable time was
originally premised on the assumption that a customer was under
no duty to organize his business so that forgery of cheques could
not take place. 231 These early decisions were given when the
authority and scope of Young v. Grote232 were doubted, 233 and
"before the MacMillan case 234 had brought out the duty of care
that the customer owes to his banker". 235 Unfortunately, the
231 See, e.g., The Kepitigalla Rubber Estates, Ltd. v. The National Bank of India, Ltd.,
[1909] 2 K.B. 1010; and Columbia Graphophone Co. v. Union Bank of Canada (1916),
34 D.L.R. 743, 38 O.L.R. 326 (S.C.).
232 Supra, footnote 214.

233 See in general, footnotes 215-16 and text, supra.
234 Supra, footnote 217.

235 Lord Chorley and P. E. Smart, Leading Cases in the Law of Banking, 4th ed. (1977), p.
69.
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change in status of Young v. Grote has not prompted a reevaluation of the rules establishing the customer's absence of a
duty to examine bank statements.
As for the issue of improper office management which enables
the creation of forged endorsements, I have expressed my view
elsewhere that the existence of s. 60 of the United Kingdom BEA
could be the reason why the courts have not found a duty of care
in that connection. 236 Section 60 shifts the loss from the bona fide
bank to the last party in possession of the cheque, regardless of
any negligence. 23 7 Being broader in its operation than negligence,
the effect of this section is to make the existence of a duty of care
on the part of the customer irrelevant when considering the
authority of the drawee bank to debit the drawer's account with
amounts of cheques paid on forged endorsements. The provision,
which has no counterpart in the Canadian Act, could thus be the
cause of the failure to recognize the duty of care which a customer
owes to his bank.
Against this background it is not inconceivable that Canadian
courts will eventually recognize the existence of a duty of care in
connection with cheque forgeries. In fact, the process is well
under way. The minority opinion of Laskin J. (as he then was) in
Arrow Transfer Co. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada 38 represents a
significant turning point. In that case, Laskin J. did "not think it
[was] too late to fasten upon bank customers . . . a duty to
examine bank statements with reasonable care and to report
account discrepancies within a reasonable time". 239 On the facts
of the case, Laskin J. found the customer negligent in employing
236 Supra, footnote 227 at pp. 427-8.
237 Section 60 of the United Kingdom BEA reads as follows:
60. When a bill payable to order on demand is drawn on a banker, and the
banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill in good faith and in the ordinary course
of business, it is not incumbent on the banker to show that the indorsement of the
payee or any subsequent indorsement was made by or under the authority of the
person whose indorsement it purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have
paid the bill in due course, although such indorsement has been forged or made
without authority.
Whenever a bank pays a bill in due course under the terms of this provision, it is
entitled to debit the drawer's account: Charles v. Blackwell (1876), 1 C.P.D. 548
(H.C.J.), affd 2 C.P.D. 151 (C.A.). A concise history of s. 60 together with a rationale
thereto is to be found in Kessler, "Forged Indorsements", 47 Yale L.J. 863 (1938), at
pp. 868-71.
238 (1972), 27 D.L.R. (3d) 81, [1972] S.C.R. 845.
239 Ibid., at p. 101 D.L.R., p. 873 S.C.R.
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an untrustworthy employee in a sensitive position as well as in
employing inadequate procedures for discovering fraud. Other
opinions in this direction include the dissent of Spence J. in Royal
Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd.240 and
the case of Number 10 Management Ltd. v. Royal Bank of
Canada.241 In the former, Spence J. was prepared to find a drawer
liable for the loss caused by the forgery of the payee's
endorsement by a dishonest clerk of the drawer on the basis that
"it would have been quite easy [for the drawer] in proper office
management to have designed sufficient methods of checking and
verifying to have defeated [the drawer's dishonest clerk's]
scheme". 2 42 In the latter, Monnin J.A. of the Manitoba Court of
Appeal spoke of "a duty on a bank's customer to examine bank
documents regularly and to report discrepancies in such
documents within a reasonable time of any discovery of error or
forgeries" .243

It remains to be seen whether this departure from the traditional restrictive view of the duty of care will gain universal
acceptance. 244 An encouraging recent development is Canadian
Pacific Hotels Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal.245 Here, the customer's
employee in the accounting department forged the customer's
signature on cheques taken from the customer's cheque book.
These cheques bearing the drawer's forged signature, were paid
by the payor bank which debited the customer's account with
their amounts. Bank statements were sent periodically to the
customer where they were checked only by the forger. When the
customer found out that it had been defrauded by its employee, it
sued the bank for the amounts of the forged cheques. Its action
was dismissed even though no verification agreement governed
the customer-bank relationship. Montgomery J. concluded that
"while the relationship between a banker and its customer is
contractual[,] the written contract or banking agreement does not
necessarily govern the whole relationship". 246 He then held, on
(1976), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 26, [197712 S.C.R. 456.
241(1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (Man. C.A.).
242 Supra, footnote 240 at p. 46 D.L.R., p. 457 S.C.R.
243Supra, footnote 241 at pp. 103-4.
244 A decision which declined to depart from the traditional restrictive view is Holman v.
Royal Bank of Canada (1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 154 (B.C. Co. Ct.).
245 (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 560,122 D.L.R. (3d) 519 (H.C.J.).
246 Ibid., at p. 571 O.R., p. 530 D.L.R.
240
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the basis of "commercial custom", 247 that "a sophisticated
commercial customer ... owes a duty to the bank to operate an
acceptable internal control system so that both the bank and its
customer are jointly engaged in prevention and minimization of
losses occurring through forgeries". 248 On the facts of the case,
the court had no difficulty in finding breach of duty to the bank by
the customer which "was negligent in failing to properly supervise
its employee . . . and in failing to follow proper accounting
2 49
procedure with respect to the bank reconciliations".
It is noteworthy that Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd. speaks of a
duty of care imposed on "a sophisticated commercial customer",
owed only to the payor bank. Even if the case is universally
accepted, it remains to be seen whether its holding will be
extended to recognize a duty of care owed by every customer to
all subsequent parties on an instrument. My preference is that a
broad duty of care be introduced by statute as was done in Article
3 of the UCC. Noting that "[b]y drawing the instrument and
'setting it afloat upon a sea of strangers' the maker or drawer
voluntarily enters into a relation with later holders which justifies
his responsibility",250 the drafters expressly provided a rationale
for a duty of care in connection with forgery of negotiable instruments. UCC 3-406 accordingly provides that a person "who by his
negligence substantially contributes to . . . the making of an
unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the ... lack of
authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or
other payor". This is in addition to UCC 3-404(1), which corresponds to BEA s. 49(1): "[a]ny unauthorized signature is wholly
inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he
... is precluded from denying it". There is also a specific section
providing for a bank customer's duty to examine periodical bank
statements (UCC 4-406).251
247 Ibid., at p. 573 O.R., p. 532 D.L.R.
248 Ibid., at p. 574 O.R., p. 533 D.L.R.
249 Ibid.
250 Official Comment 2 to UCC 3-406.

251UCC 4-406 provides in part as follows:
§4-406.

Customer's Duty to Discover and Report Unauthorized Signature or
Alteration
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied by
items paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the statement and
items pursuant to a request or instructions of its customer or otherwise in a
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In the final analysis, I believe that legislative treatment of
negligence in connection with the law of bills and notes should be
more detailed. The duty of care should be specifically drafted to
apply to a selection of employees, to office management and to
the examination of bank statements. Separate consideration must
be given to the standard and scope of the duty of care imposed on
consumers,252 non-profit organizations,253 and different types and
sizes of business entities. Attention should also be given to the
statutory treatment of contributory negligence by a bank. Serious
consideration should be given to the insurability of losses
imposed on negligent bank customers and the effect of such
insurance on the entire scheme of allocation of forgery losses. All
these questions involve important refinements of the basic negligence principle which ought not to be neglected in drafting a
comprehensive legislative reform.
(iii) The estopped customer and the collecting bank
The last issue to be discussed in conjunction with the responsiveness (to policy considerations) of the scheme allocating
forgery losses is the possible cause of action of a drawer or bank
customer from whom a cheque is stolen, against a collecting
reasonable manner makes the statement and items available to the customer, the
customer must exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement
and items to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an item and
must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to
comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the customer is
precluded from asserting against the bank
(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the bank also
establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such failure; and
(b) an unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any
other item paid in good faith by the bank after the first item and
statement was available to the customer for a reasonable period not
exceeding fourteen calendar days and before the bank receives notification from the customer of any such unauthorized signature or alteration.
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer establishes lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s).
252 Cf. the $50 ceiling to liability for an unauthorized use of a credit card under s. 133 of
the United States Consumer Credit Protection Act (1968), 15 U.S.C. ss. 1601-1691e as
amended.
253Cf. Jackson v. The First NationalBank of Memphis, Inc., 403 S.W. 2d 109 (Tenn. App.
1966); Church found not to be negligent in employing a fraudulent financial secretary
as well as in failing to supervise him and do proper bank reconciliations.
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bank. The cheque might be stolen as a blank cheque, or after
having been genuinely signed by the drawer.
The customer whose signature as a drawer was forged, and who
had failed to examine properly the bank statements and report
the forgery, attempted in Arrow Transfer254 as well as in Number
10 Management2 5 to sue the depositary bank in conversion or for
money had and received. The attempts failed. The courts
reasoned that no valuable assets of the customer (namely cheques
having their own value) passed through the collecting bank. As
explained by Laskin J., in order to succeed the plaintiff must be
the true owner of the piece of paper qua cheque, not merely qua
piece of paper.256 In both cases, therefore, a customer who lost
against the payor bank was unsuccessful in seeking to shift the
loss on to the depositary bank.
A similar result was reached in the United States in Stone
Webster Engineering Corp. v. The First National Bank & Trust
Company of Greenfield.2 7 In that case, a cheque bearing a
genuine drawer's signature was stolen from the drawer by an
unfaithful employee of the drawer. The unfaithful employee
forged the payee's signature and collected the proceeds of the
cheque from the payor bank through a depositary bank. In
dismissing the drawer's action against the depositary bank the
court opined that since the drawer did not have the right of a
holder to present the cheque to the drawee for payment, he had
no "valuable rights" in it and therefore could not sue in conversion. According to the court, the "value of [the drawer's] rights
was limited to the physical paper on which [the cheques] were
written".258
It is generally accepted that this state of law is adequately
responsive to policy considerations. The question of the negligence of the drawee bank's customer is decided in litigation
between him and the drawee bank; having lost in such an action,
the customer should not be allowed to shift the loss to the
collecting bank. 259 Furthermore, not being a party to the verifi254 Supra, footnote 238.
255 Supra, footnote 241.
256 Supra, footnote 238 at pp. 103-4 D.L.R., p. 876 S.C.R.
257 184 N.E. 2d 358 (Mass. 1962).
258 Ibid., at p. 362. For a recent discussion, see Williams, "Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United
California Bank: A New Approach to the Problem of Drawer v. Collecting Bank", 31
Has. L.J. 221 (1980).
259 J. White and R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 2nd ed. (1980), pp. 587-8.
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cation agreement, the collecting bank cannot invoke in its favour
the customer's "estoppel by contract". To the extent that
"estoppel by contract" is the rationale given in Canada to the
negligent customer's failure to assert the forgery of his
signature, 260 recognition of the conversion or the money had and
received action against the collecting bank could therefore alway.
result in a shifting of the loss to the collecting bank, even if it
could prove negligence on the part of the drawee bank's
customer. This indeed is unjustifiable.
Unfortunately, in Jervis B. Webb Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Bank
of Nova Scotia and Reid,261 in a fact situation similar to that of
Stone Webster262 (theft of a genuine cheque), an Ontario High
Court judge upheld the drawer's action against the collecting
bank in conversion as well as for money had and received. The
decision is unconvincing as a matter of legal analysis. None of the
authorities relied on by Fraser J. compelled the result he reached.
Needless to say, the decision is inconsistent with the policy
considerations as discussed above. The drawee bank's customer
should not be allowed to circumvent his estoppel against the
drawee by suing a collecting bank.
Keeping in mind this inconsistency in case law, legislative
reform should deal with this issue directly.
Conclusion
In connection with the uniformity among the Bills of Exchange
Act jurisdictions, the observation has been made that "[t]he
interpretation by Canadian courts of the Canadian law of bills
more closely reflects the Australian courts' interpretation of the
Australian law than the New York courts' interpretation of [the
American Uniform] N.I.L. 263 resembles that of the courts of
Illinois". 264 Such uniformity may be jeopardized by unilateral
action aimed at extensive reformation of the Canadian Act. At
the same time, as demonstrated in this paper, in some areas legislative reform is almost overdue. The right course could therefore
260 See in general, footnotes 228-9 and text, supra.

261 [1965]20.R. 100, 49 D.L.R. (2d) 692 (H.C.J.).

262 Supra, footnote 257.
263 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law ("N.I.L.") preceded Article 3 of the UCC
as the uniform statute governing bills and notes in the various American states.
264 Barak, supra, footnote 25 at p. 11.
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be selective reform, directed at revising particular provisions
only. 265 Alternatively, a new payment code, if adopted, will
supersede the Bills of Exchange Act in any event. Such a new
code should take into account a revision in the areas discussed
here.

Comment on Benjamin Geva's Paper:
"Reflections on the Need to Revise
the Bills of Exchange Act - Some Doctrinal Aspects"
Stephen A. Scott*
Sir Mackenzie Chalmers' great statute, in its Canadian form,
governs the life of a note from its very creation, until its
extinction on its return to its maker (Bills of Exchange Act,' ss.
141, 186). Not content with that, the Act even holds out hope of
resurrection (s. 73). In light of these and many other achievements, it seems to me obvious that its amendment is not by any to
be enterprized, nor taken in hand, unadvisedly, lightly, or
wantonly; but reverently, discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in
the fear of God.
This being acknowledged, I fully agree that the statute could
use revision, though I would move much more cautiously than, I
think, would Professor Geva. Certainly it could be improved in
many dozens of details unlikely to involve much controversy.
Falconbridge himself has pointed to a large number of useful
reforms.
Professor Geva has however chosen several important
branches of the law of banking and negotiable instruments as the
subject of his address. As I have not had the leisure to prepare a
written response doing justice even to these, I shall forego the
temptation to deal with others. In doing so I am putting aside, for
example, the whole question of revision of requirements of form;
a subject which includes (as merely one instance) the important
265 Among Commonwealth jurisdictions, there is no body designed to secure uniformity in
law reform and revision as is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in the United States. Co-ordination in revising the BEA is politically
unrealistic. This is not to mention the fact that quite a few BEA jurisdictions are no
longer affiliated with the Commonwealth.
Of the Bar of the Province of Quebec and the Faculty of Law, McGill University.
I R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5 as amended.

